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Abstract
The technical legal expertise of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, is rarely questioned. However, from its inception
critics have questioned its partiality by drawing attention to apparent extrajudicial
influences on its decisions. While there has been no lack of research assessing the ICJ
judges’ voting behavior, methodological limitations of prior research designs have stymied
empirical assessments of the extent and nature of extrajudicial factors’ influence over the
ICJ judges’ voting behaviors. This dissertation challenges previous research concluding
that political and military alignments have no effect on judicial decision-making. In
contrast to previous research findings, this dissertation reports that ICJ judges vote closely
with those from countries that have regional or military alignments with the countries that
nominate or appoint them. Judges from countries with a similar degree of economic and
democratic development, and with cultural or religious similarities, also voted closely with
each other. This dissertation concludes with a consideration of the causes and implications
of the influence of non-legal factors on the World Court’s decisions.
Keywords: Bloc Voting, International Court of Justice, Cluster Analysis.
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Introduction

As a student of international law, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its
decisions are always the essential part of my study. As I was fascinated by how the
prestigious judges in the World Court were able to mitigate and resolve disputes between
states and had ruled against the superpower in cases like the Nicaragua, there were some
moments that I believed that the ICJ would be the ideal solution to resolve disputes and
prevent the occurance of wars. Unfortunately, it did not take long for me to realize that
states are not particularly interested in using the international courts for dispute settlement.
The idea that all disputes could be resolved peacefully through adjudication was the
Utopian ideal, far from being realized. The countries in my region, the Asian States, in
particular, are known to share little enthusiasm in settling interstate disputes through
international adjudication.1 Aside from cultural reasons, as advanced by some scholars as

1

Only 13 cases brought before the ICJ are with the participation of Asian States (less than 10 percent of all

cases), see Jin-Hyun Paik, Asian States’ Participation in International Adjudication: Comments, EJIL:
Talk!, Jan. 18, 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/asian-states-participation-in-international-adjudicationcomments/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). For discussion about Asian countries reluctance to be involved
with the International adjudication system, see e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, International Law and the Reform of
1

the primary reason for Asian States’ resistance to international adjudication, 2

Asian

countries’ passivity toward international adjudication was often attributed to their aversion

the International Court of Justice, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY 579, 579 (Antony Anghie & Garry Sturgess eds., 1998); Joseph L. Daly, Is
the International Court of Justice Worth the Effort, 20(3) AKRON L. REV. 391, 403–404 (1987); Gillian
Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the Asian Pacific, 21 MELB. UNI. L. REV. 650, 656
(1997); J. J. G. SYATAUW, SOME NEWLY ESTABLISHED ASIAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 231, 233 (1961) (admitting that Asian states are reluctant to use the ICJ, but arguing
that the older western powers show the same practices); Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Commonwealth of Australia, Asian Regional Security Issues, Address to the Netherlands
Atlantic Commission, The Hague (Jan. 27, 1997), available at
https://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1997/atlantic.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). The reluctance to
resolve disputes through international adjudication not only applies to the utilization of the ICJ but also to
other international courts and tribunals. See e.g., Cristine Chinkin, Regional Problems, in THE LAW OF THE
SEA IN THE ASIAN PACIFIC REGION: DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 237, 257–59 (James Crawford &
Donald R. Rothweel eds., 1995); Marcia D. Harpaz, China and International Tribunals: Onward from the
WTO, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 43, 45 (Colin Picker, Jonathan Greenacre &
Lisa Toohey eds., 2015) (pointing out that China’s acceptance and use of the WTO DSB is a distinctive
departure from its past policy); Karen J. Alter, The New International Courts: A Bird’s Eye View 1, 2
(Buffet Ctr. for Int’l and Comparative Studies, Working Paper No. 09-001, 2009); Mark Findlay, Sign Up
or Sign off – Asia’s Reluctant Engagement with the International Criminal Court, 3 CAMBODIA L. & POL. J.
75 (2014).
2

It has been advanced that the Confucian cultural legacy, which disfavors third party binding settlement on

the basis of law, leads to such practice, see Ko Swan Sik, the Attitude of Asia States Towards the
2

to the conservative attitude of the Court.3 Many Asian countries not only perceived the
ICJ as a Euro-centric institution biased in favor of European and America states4 but also
viewed the ICJ’s rulings as decisions that reflect the political purpose of the imperial states
that harm the interests of other small and weaker nations.5 In addition to Asian countries,
countries in other regions share similar skepticism about the decision-making of the ICJ
being influenced by the extrajudicial factor.6 For example, throughout the ICJ’s history,

International Court of Justice Revisited, in JUDGE SHIGERU OD: LIBER AMICORUM 165. 165 (Nisuke
Andåo, Edward McWhinney & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2002); Paik, supra note 1; for discussion about the
influence of “cultural factors,” see Veronica L. Taylor & Michael Pryles, The Cultures of Dispute
Resolution in Asia, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 2–5 (Michael Pryles ed., 3rd ed. 2006). T
3

See e.g., Sik, supra note 2, 170; Findlay, supra note 1, at 91; Harpaz, supra note 1; see also infra n.4–5.

4

Manohar Sarin, The Asian-African States and the Development of International Law, in THIRD WORLD

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (Frederick Snyder & Surakiart Sathirathai eds., 1987);
Daly, supra note 1, at 404;
5

ZHAO LIHAI, GUOCHIFA CHIBEN LILUN (国际法基本理论) [The Basic Theories of International Law] 65-

68 (1990); see also JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
1444 (1974) (quoting International Court of Justice-A Shelter for Gangsters, JEN-MIN JIH-PAO (人民日报)
[PEOPLE'S DAILY], July 26, 1966, at 6); Sik, supra note 2, 173–74.
6

Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a world court, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 5 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzaurice eds., 1996); Shiv R. S. Bedi, African
Participation in the International Court of Justice, A Statistical Appraisal (1946–1998), 6 AFR. Y.B. INT’L
L. 181, 183–84 (1998) (illustrating how the 1966 South West Africa case influenced the Afro-Asian group
3

the Soviet Union (and Russia currently) never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court and was never a party before the ICJ. The Soviet politicians and scholars have also
repeatedly advanced the claim that the ICJ is part of a political arena where the imperialist
countries would promote their interests and denounce their political opponents.7 In the
United States, there are also similar criticisms stating that ICJ judges may decide cases
based on their political preference instead of the law.8 Although I am skeptical, or at least
not fully convinced, about the truthfulness of these assertions that accuse the ICJ of being
biased in favor of European and American countries, I am surprised by how this area
remains understudied. Not only have international law scholars paid little attention to this
question, but the question about extrajudicial factors’ influence over the principle judicial
organ of the United Nations has grasped the attention of few legal realist scholars.

to change the imbalance in the ICJ’s composition); A.O. Adede, Judicial Settlement in Perspective, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS, 47, 51 (A.S. Muller, D. Raič &
J.M. Thuránszky eds. 1997) (indicating that the ICJ was sought as “a white man’s court, dispensing white
man’s justice”)
7

See infra n.110–115.

8

DENISON KITCHELL, TOO GRAVE A RISK, THE CONNALLY AMENDMENT ISSUE 103-11 (1963); Jeane

Kirkpatrick, Law and Reciprocity, addressed by Ambassador, Apr. 12, 1984, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
59, 65 (1984) (expressing concerns for the U.S. accepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction).
4

In the field of international law, the ICJ is certainly not understudied. Almost all
textbooks relating to international law include a chapter or a section introducing the ICJ
and its institutional design. The ICJ decisions have also been thoroughly analyzed by legal
scholars and there are mounds of literature that have assessed the effectiveness of the Court,
the procedural and evidence rules of the Court, and how the ICJ decisions have influenced
the development of international law. Although states and scholars’ concerns about the ICJ
being affected by extrajudicial factors are widely noted in the literature, only a handful of
scholars have attempted to address such concerns. The question about what extrajudicial
factors have influenced the ICJ’s decision-making remains unobserved. The same drought
also happens in another set of literature that extensively observes the extrajudicial factors’
influence over (international) judicial adjudication.
For long, legal formalists and realists have argued about the role and the impact of
extrajudicial factors in judicial decision-making. In contrast to the legal formalists’
argument that legal questions can, and should, be answered based on distinctly legal

5

materials9 without considering non-legal factors,10 legal realists such as Jerome Frank
argue that the rational element in law is nothing but an illusion and that non-legal factors
have always been an essential part of judicial decision-making.11 Extending beyond the
jurisprudential debates about which theory best describes the practice and function of the
law, legal and political scientists have attempted to unravel the mystery of judicial
decision-making through examining the judges’ voting behaviors. Scholars have conducted
empirical research to examine how social factors, such as the judges’ ethnicity and social
status, have influenced the conviction rate, assigning of punishment and sentencing in trial
court decisions. 12 Others have also observed how the judges’ gender 13 and policy

9
10

Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (1983).
See e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111,

111 (2010); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1986);
11

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND MODERN MIND 131–35 (1930).

12

See e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence,

57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000); Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Decisions of Black and White Judges:
Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1197, 1211-14 (1990); Thomas M. Uhlman,
Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884, 891-94 (1978).
13

See e.g., RUTH MACKENZIE, KATE MALLESON, PENNY MARTIN & PHILIPPE SANDS, SELECTING

INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 48–50 (2010); Claire S.H. Lim, Bernardo
6

preference affected the outcome of the case. 14 Among all factors, scholars were
particularly interested in learning politics’ influence over the decision-making of the
court. 15 Although the debates between the legal formalist and realists have stipulated

Silveira & James M. Snyder, Jr., Do Judges’ Characteristics Matter? Ethnicity, Gender, and Partisanship
in Texas State Trail Courts, 18(2) AM. L. & ECON. REV. 302 (2016); Lady Hale, Making a Difference - Why
We Need a More Diverse Judiciary, 56 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 281, 286–292 (2005); see also GLEIDER
HERNANDEZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 135–36 (2014)
(pointing out that there is not a gender-based approach to international law found in the cases that Judge
Rosalyn Higgins, the first female ICJ judge, presided over. But there may be such as additional women
judges were elected to the court); Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and
Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 131–32 (1993).
14

There are many more factors tested, such as the influence of collegiality, see e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The

Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); Harry T. Edwards,
Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998). See also Alex
Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
993 (1993); Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1551,
1552 (1966); S. Sydney Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns on the United States Supreme Court, 22
J. POL. 629 (1960); John Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1958); NANCY L. MAVEETY, THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2003);
GLENDON SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959); HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948).
15

See e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, Andrew P. Morriss, Charting The Influences On The Judicial

Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998) (arguing that legal and
extralegal factors both play an important role in shaping the judges’ decision); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
7

scholars’ interests to assess the impact of extrajudicial factors on adjudication empirically,
most of the previous literature limited their studies to observing the judicial behaviors of
domestic courts, 16 and have paid little attention to extrajudicial factors’ impact on the
behaviors of international tribunals. Owing to the scarcity of scholarship studying how
extrajudicial factors influence the function of the ICJ, this dissertation aims to fill in the

Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (arguing that the judges’
political preferences influence the outcome of their review of agency decisions); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A new Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87
(2008) (pointing out the judges’ bias citation practices were sourced from the judges’ political preference);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (showing the splits between the judges appointed
by the Republican and Democratic Parties and the political influence over their judicial behavior).
16

Amongst the many studies, see e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term: A Political

Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Donald Songer & Stefanie Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The
Impact of Justices’ Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1049 (1996); Tracey
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323
(1992); Claire S. H. Lim, Media Influence on Courts: Evidence from Civil Case Adjudication, 17(1) AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 87 (2015); Shai Danzigera, Jonathan Levavb & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous factors in
judicial decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 6889 (2011) (empirically examines how taking a
break could influence the judges’ mental resources and thus affects the outcome of the case)
8

gaps in the literature and assess and identify the extrajudicial factors affecting the decisionmaking of the ICJ.
(1) Deficiencies of the prior studies
In the handful of studies that have addressed the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors, they
provide limited information about the ICJ judges’ collective voting behaviors. This is either
because the scope of their research is limited to the voting preferences of individual judges
or they are only able to assess the voting behaviors of the judges that have co-voting
experience (that have decided a case together, this problem will be discussed in detail in
Chapters 2 and 3).
After Hersch Lauterpacht pointed out that judges serving on international courts are
keen to vote in favor of their home country and appointer,17 scholars have been dedicated
to confirming how the nationality attachment or the appointer-appointee relationship has
influenced the decision-making of the ICJ judges that are from and appointed by the party
states. In the studies of Thomas Hensley, William Samore, Il Suh, and also Adam Smith,
scholars have consistently reported that ICJ judges from or appointed by party states (the

17

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 230–32 (1933).
9

‘national judges’18) show a strong preference, and perhaps are biased to vote in favor of
their home countries and appointers. However, because there will only be two or less
national judges in a bench composed of fifteen judges,19 and the votes of national judges
are likely to cancel each other out, the national judges’ only have limited influence on the
outcome of the case. The studies over the national judges’ voting behavior only provide

18

The term ‘national judges’ is borrowed from Hensley where he generally refers to the regular (elected)

judges from party states, or the ad hoc judges appointed by party states. See Thomas Hensley, National
Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 568 (1968) [hereinafter Hensley,
National Bias]. For similar use, see Il Ro Suh, Voting Behaviour of National Judges in International Courts
(1969) 63 AM J. INT’L L. 224 (1969). However, it should be noted that not all ad hoc judges are nationals of
the party states as they are quite frequently selected from an unrelated country. In some studies, ‘national
judges’ specifically refers to regular judges from party states and does not includes the ad hoc judges from
and appointed by the disputing parties. See Stephen M. Schwebel, National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of
the International Court of Justice, 48(4) INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 889 (1999); Christian Tomuschat, National
Representation of Judges and Legitimacy of International Jurisdictions: Lessons From ICJ to ECJ?, in THE
FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 183 (Ingolf Pernice, Juliane
Kokott & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006).
19

This is only an approximate number. If there are ad hoc judges participating in the case, the number of

judges may exceed 15; however, in the case that the judges were absent for personal or health concerns, the
actual number of judges hearing over the case may be less than 15.
10

limited help in unraveling the mystery over the judicial decision-making in the ICJ and the
voting behaviors of the judges’ from non-party states remain unobserved.
Although some studies attempt to observe the collective voting behaviors of the ICJ
judges, their ability to do so is seriously limited by their choice of analysis method. In these
studies, most scholars calculate and compare the voting agreements between pairs of judges
to examine the closeness between these judges’ voting patterns. However, as this method
is only suitable comparing judges that have co-voting experience, it is not an ideal method
to examine the ICJ judges’ collective voting behaviors since a portion of the ICJ bench is
replaced every three years20 and not all ICJ judges have co-voted with one another. Taking
Hensley’s study as an example, after excluding the judges that have no or very few covoting experiences with each other from observation, the number of judges retained in his
research for observation reduced from 48 to 14.21 The co-voting requirement seriously
limits the number of judges that can be observed in these studies and leaves the majority

20

Though they can be reelected. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 25, 1945, art. 13(1),

59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
21

Thomas Hensley, Bloc Voting on the International Court of Justice, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 39, 43

(1978) [hereinafter Hensley, Bloc Voting].
11

judges out of observation. 22 Recognizing that this constraint severely limits the
interpretative power of the previous studies, it is also a challenge that this dissertation must
overcome if I wish to observe and examine the voting behavior of ICJ judges.
(2) Research questions
In the existing literature, the question of how the ICJ is influenced by extrajudicial
factors and what factors influence the ICJ’s decision-making remains unexamined. There
lacks research that studies the ICJ judges’ collective voting behavior and that can address
states parties’ concerns about the extrajudicial factors’ influence over the decision-making
of the ICJ. With the goals to fill in the gaps in the literature and supplement the limited
research over the ICJ judges’ voting behavior, the goals of this dissertation are twofold.
First, I aim to observe and report the cohesive voting behaviors among the ICJ judges. With

22

Hensley concluded that Communist judges voted cohesively in the ICJ and there are also voting blocs

formed by European and American judges. See id. at 54–56. However, Terry argues that there is no
evidence showing that the ICJ is dominated by a conservative faction, see G. Terry, Factional Behaviour
on the International Court of Justice: An Analysis of the First and Second Courts (1945-1951) and the
Sixth and Seventh Courts (1961-1967), 10 MELB U. L. REV. 59, 117 (1975); Weiss identified a few voting
blocs in the ICJ, but argues that these voting blocs are unrelated with regional or political influences, see
Edith B. Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123, 130 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987)
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the help of statistical and bloc analysis, I shall visualize the voting clusters that emerge in
the court. In order to investigate how the judges’ voting behaviors changed in different
time-periods and how the emergence of different clusters corresponds to the rapidly
changing world, time and dispute types shall be set as control variables and I shall assess
the voting blocs that emerge in different periods of history and when the court hears
different types of disputes. Second, through OLS regression analysis, I aim to identify the
extrajudicial factors that correlate with the clustering behavior of the ICJ judges. In
particular, I aim to report if and how regional, military, and social connections between the
judges’ home countries correlate with the judges’ clustering behavior and how the
influence of international politics is reflected in decision-making of the ICJ.
(3) Expected contribution
The contribution of this dissertation can be observed from both substantive and
methodological aspects. From the substantive perspective, by reporting how the ICJ judges’
voting behaviors reflect the influence of regional, military, and social factors of their home
countries, this dissertation demonstrates the correlation between the influence of
extrajudicial factors and the voting patterns of the ICJ decision-making. In addition to
demonstrating the existence of the Communist and NATO blocs in the ICJ (which directly
13

challenges the findings of Weiss’ earlier study), I shall further point out that ICJ judges
from countries with similar levels of wealth and levels of democracy are also likely to vote
closely with each other. The findings of this dissertation can not only supplement the
understanding of the ICJ judges’ voting behavior but can also enrich the realist scholars’
understanding of the function of international adjudication. For the countries that are
underrepresented in the ICJ, the findings of this dissertation also provide supporting
evidence for them to argue that there is a need to reorganize the current distribution of the
ICJ seats so the power and influence of extrajudicial factors can be mitigated.
From a methodological perspective, this dissertation contributes to the literature in
two aspects. The first contribution to the scholarship is made through sharing the dataset
of the ICJ judges’ votes compiled in this dissertation with other researchers. Owing to the
scarcity of the research that studies the ICJ judges’ voting behavior and the yet-to-bedeveloped tradition of sharing dataset in the area of empirical legal studies, I was unable
to acquire the ICJ judges’ voting records from other scholars that have assessed the same
question.23 All datasets recording the ICJ judges’ votes used in this research were collected

23

I have contacted an author that has published in this area and ask if he is willing to share his dataset since

the results found in this research is different with the conclusion of his study. At the beginning, the author
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and compiled from scratch. 24 After personally experiencing the challenging and timeconsuming data compiling and coding process, I feel it is a waste of time for all researchers
studying this subject to go through the same process. I aim to remedy the situation by
making the dataset that I have compiled publicly available25 so that future scholars in need
of such information no longer need to go through the same data collecting processes and
can save valuable time and resources. More importantly, the disclosure of the data used in
this dissertation can also ensure that other scholars can verify the findings of this research
and thus it strengthens the validity the arguments made in this dissertation.
Lastly, as this dissertation does not assess the closeness between the judges voting
patterns through calculating the voting agreements between them but through the

replied positively and expressed his willingness to share the raw dataset. But after learning that my analysis
reached conclusion different from his study, the author refused to make any further correspondence and I
never received the dataset he used.
24

Ginsburg and McAdams’s work is one of the very few that discloses their coding data. Nevertheless,

because I adopt a different research approach from Ginsburg and McAdam’s work, their dataset only
provides limited assistance to my research. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1331–
39 (2004).
25

The dataset will be uploaded to an online depository system available for the public to utilize and

examine.
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difference between the judge's votes in relation to the judges from the permanent members
of the Security Council, the scope of the research is no longer limited to judges with covoting experience. This improvement over the previous analysis method allows this
dissertation to compare the voting patterns between judges that served in the ICJ in a
similar time period but never had the chance to vote together, which significantly expands
the scope of analysis of this dissertation.
(4) Chapter plan
This dissertation contains six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter. Chapter
1 explains this dissertation’s research plans, the importance of this research, and the issues
that will be discussed in each chapter. Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the ICJ’s
establishment, jurisdiction, caseloads, and also the composition of its bench. In the first
part, I shall demonstrate how the usage of the ICJ decreased after its first twenty years and
was slightly revived after the 1980s. Through highlighting the uneven distribution of the
ICJ bench seats, I aim to flesh out the possible reasons that drove the states to distrust the
ICJ and speculate about its impartiality. The second part of Chapter 2 reviews the prior
studies that have assessed the ICJ judges’ voting behavior. Aside from reporting the
conclusions and arguments advanced in these studies, I also assess the analytical methods
16

used in these prior research to understand how this dissertation can build on the existing
literature and improve the research methods used in these prior studies.
Chapter 3 introduces the research plan and analysis methods used in this dissertation.
The first part of Chapter 3 illustrates how the Euclidean distance measuring method, the
hierarchical cluster analysis, and OLS regression help this dissertation to measure and
observe the cohesive voting behaviors among the ICJ judges. In particular, I explain how
this dissertation is no longer bound by the co-voting requirement and can observe the
voting distances between judges that have never voted together before. In the second part
of Chapter 3, I explain the coding method I use to record the ICJ judges’ votes and some
of the problems that I have faced during this stage of research. The expected results and
the limits of this study are reported in this Chapter.
Chapters 4 and 5 both report the analysis results. Chapter 4 starts with reporting the
average supporting ratio of the ICJ cases to demonstrate that there are no constant and
systematic confrontations between the ICJ judges. To assess the scale of confrontations

17

that appear in each type of dispute and proceeding separately, the contentious cases26 and
advisory opinions are further divided into six and three sub-categories, respectively. The
second part of Chapter 4 reports the voting behavior of judges that come from or are
appointed by party states. As earlier studies have consistently concluded that national
judges are keen to vote in favor of their home country or appointer, my research does not
attempt to challenge these conclusions. Instead, the purpose of this section is to provide an
up-to-date assessment of the national judges’ voting behavior and to examine if the national
judges continue to vote in favor of their home country significantly more than the other
judges, or if such preferences have diminished. In the last part of Chapter 4, by pointing
out that ad hoc judges who do not share their nationality with their appointer voted for their
appointer at a ratio similar to those with citizenship from the party states, I argue that
nationality linkage is not the primary reason causing ad hoc judges to be keen to vote in
favor of their appointers. In addition, I also report that party states do not have a strong

26

‘Contentious case’ refers to proceedings where state parties brought interstate disputes to the ICJ for

adjudication. This is in contrast with advisory opinions, where the ICJ is only asked to provide opinions
over international law questions but not to settle disputes between the countries.
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preference in appointing their citizen as ad hoc judges as almost half of the ad hoc judges
were selected from a third party.
Chapter 5 presents the main findings of this dissertation. The first section of Chapter
5 uses cluster analysis to identify and reports the voting blocs that emerge in the ICJ in
different periods of history. Moreover, I visualize and present the judges’ clustering
behaviors through dendrogram graphs to make the voting blocs easier to identify and
observe. In the second part of Chapter 5, I use the regression to assess the correlation
between the voting distance between the judges and social connections between the judges’
home countries. In particular, I argue that the judges from countries that share similar
political ideology, economic development, military alignment, or geographical region
voted more closely with each other than those without such connections at a statistically
significant level. The NATO, Communist, OECD, and Christianity voting blocs identified
in this dissertation are all indications showing how the decision-making of the ICJ
correlates with the influence of extrajudicial factors.
Chapter 6 summarizes this dissertation’s findings. The concluding remarks and
possible research directions for further studies are also provided in this section.
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The ICJ and the Studies on ICJ Judges’ Voting Behaviors

Chapter 2 provides the an introduction to the ICJ and a summary of the prior literature
that has empirically assessed the ICJ judges’ voting behavior and performance. The first
section begins with introducing the ICJ’s establishment, the function of the ICJ’s
jurisdiction, and the composition of the bench. Information and data regarding the ICJ’s
caseload and the types of cases that are often brought before ICJ are also assessed. The
second section of this chapter provides a review of the existing literature. The two main
types of scholarship reviewed include (1) studies that assess national judges’ keenness to
vote in favor of their home country and appointer, and (2) studies that observe the bloc
voting behaviors among the ICJ judges. In addition to summarizing the arguments and
findings, I shall briefly explain the analytical methodology deployed in these earlier studies.
Through assessing the pros and cons of the analysis methods of the prior research, I shall
point out how this dissertation improves on the basis of the prior studies’ contributions and
is differentiated from these previous studies.
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1.

The International Court of Justice

1.1 The Establishment of the ICJ
After World War II, together with the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton
Woods system, the global community aimed to secure and maintain international peace
and security through establishing international political and economic cooperation, and
creating a judicial adjudicative body to foster the peaceful settlement of interstate
disputes.27 With this three-prong design, it was hoped that war could be prevented and the
international community could move toward a “rule of law” era instead of a world where
the “law of the jungle” prevailed.28 The ICJ was created to fulfill this mission and bears
the responsibility to offer the “possibility of substituting orderly judicial processes for the

27

See generally, J. G. Collier, The International Court of Justice and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in

FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 364 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,
1996)
28

NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11, 319–20

(1989); Hans Corell, Presentation, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
COURT 6 (Connie Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997); The Rule of Law and the Role of the International Court
of Justice in World Affairs 6, Inaugural Hilding Eek Memorial Lecture by H.E. Judge Peter Tomka,
President of the International Court Of Justice, at the Stockholm Centre for International Law and Justice,
Monday 2 December 2013, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/9/17849.pdf.
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vicissitudes of war and the reign of brutal force purpose to promote the pacific settlement
of international disputes.”29
The ICJ was established in June 1945 and began work in April 1946. According to
Article 92 of the UN Charter and Article 1 of its statute, the ICJ is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations30 and was created to promote peaceful settlement of disputes
by adjudicating interstate disputes in accordance with international law and to provide
advisory opinions on questions of international law. In the past seven decades, ICJ has
adjudicated more than one hundred contentious cases and has delivered more than twenty
advisory opinions. 31 The ICJ has served as an important international institution in
resolving international disputes and is a symbol of the world’s embracement of the rule of
law notion.

29

Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1 to Commission IV, Doc. 913 (June 12), 13 U.N.C.I.O.

Docs. 381, at 393.
30

U.N. Charter art. 92; see also ICJ Statute art. 1. Few have contested that the idea that ICJ serves as the

principle judicial organ of the United Nation is exaggerated. See Edward Gordan, The ICJ: On Its Own, 40
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 74, 83–84 (2012) (arguing that if the ICJ was not intended to be qualitatively
from its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the ICJ’s framers wished the Court
to align its judgments and opinions with those prevailing in the political organs of the UN.)
31

Data available at ICJ, http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/.
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1.2 The ICJ’s Jurisdiction
The two types of cases the ICJ can hear are contentious cases submitted by state
parties and requests for advisory opinions submitted by UN bodies. According to Article
65 of the ICJ Statute and Article 96 of the UN Charter, only UN bodies can request the ICJ
to give advisory opinions on international legal questions. Although the advisory opinions
have no legal binding force, they nevertheless are of great importance in assisting political
organs settle disputes and provide authoritative guidance on points of international law.32
With regard to contentious cases, pursuant to Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, only states may
be parties in contentious cases before the ICJ, and the Court’s jurisdiction is founded on a
consensual basis.33 In other words, states are not subjected to the ICJ’s jurisdiction unless
they have given their consent.34

32

IAN BROWLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 721 (7th ed., 2008).

33

ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 185 (2014)

[hereinafter KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION].
34

Id. (indicating that states are the holders of sovereignty and sovereignty provides states the utmost

human authority to decide on internal and external affairs. Even though states are bound by international
law, they are not bound by any other human decision-making body unless their consent is given)
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Primarily, there are three ways for states to consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction.35 If states
choose to consent to ICJ’s jurisdiction before the dispute arises, they may do so by either
entering into a treaty36 or by adding a jurisdictional clause to a treaty expressing their
willingness to accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction.37 In addition, Article 36 of the ICJ Statute also
allows states to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction for future cases through delivering a
unilateral declaration.38 Once the declaration is made, and the depositing procedures are
completed, the state is then entitled to unilaterally initiate proceedings against any other

35

For a detailed illustration of how states can consent to ICJ’s jurisdiction, see ROBERT KOLB, THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 382–558 (2013).
36

For example, see e.g., General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Dispute of 1928, April. 28,

1949, 71 U.N.T.C. 912; Inter-American Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, April 30, 1948, 30
U.N.T.C. 449; Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326.
37

For example, see e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IX,

Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278; United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea Part XV, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
38

ICJ Statute art. 36(2)–(4).
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state that has also made a similar declaration.39 The three methods mentioned above are
also known as taking the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.40
At the beginning of the ICJ’s establishment, the Soviet Union was the only permanent
member of the Security Council that did not accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.
Contrarily, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and China all consented to the
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. However, after the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
replaced the Republic of China (ROC) government in the United Nations in 1971, the PRC

39

The formality requirements for depositing a declaration are provided in Article 36(4) of the ICJ Statute.

See ICJ Statute art. 36(4): “Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the Court.”
40

As consent is always required, the terms ‘compulsory’ and ‘optional’ refer to the scope of consent

instead of the presence or absence of state consent. Accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of a forum
indicates the state commits itself to use a designated forum for dispute settlement and accepts other states to
bring a case against it in that forum at any time. See KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 188. For
further information on the compulsory jurisdiction, see VANDA LAMM, COMPULSORY JURISDICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014) (the book provides a thorough review of compulsory jurisdiction, including
its creation, how it is used, various ways states have declared acceptance of the jurisdiction and an analysis
of how it works).
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swiftly revoked the ROC’s acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.41 In 1974,
France also terminated its declaration accepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction after
Australia and New Zealand brought the Nuclear Test case against it.42 In 1986, the United
States also withdrew from the Court's compulsory jurisdiction after the initiation of the
famous Nicaragua case. 43 Currently, 72 countries have deposited their declaration

41

See Julian Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, 27 MARYLAND J. INT’L L. 154, 159–

60 (2012). The Republic of China accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36 of the
ICJ Statute in 1946.
42

See Shigeru Oda, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Myth? A

Statistical Analysis of Contentious Cases, 49(2) INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 251, 264 (2000); Vanda Lamm,
New Nuclear Cases at the Hague Court, 18 INLA CONGRESS REP. at 6–7 (2014); Don MacKay, Nuclear
Testing: New Zealand and France in the International Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1857, 1870
(1995).
43

See U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the ICJ, Department Statement, Jan.

18, 1985, DET’P ST. BULL., No. 2096, March 1985, at 64. For discussion of great powers’ reluctance to
accept compulsory jurisdiction, see e.g., Renata Szafarz, State Attitudes towards Jurisdiction, in FORTY
YEARS INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, EQUITY AND EQUALITY 1, 8–23 (Arie Bloed &
Pieter van Kijk eds., 1988); W. Michael Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction?,
80 AM. J. INT’L L. 128 (1986); Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice: How Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29, 33–34 (2006). The United States also
withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. See John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal from International
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accepting ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction,44 and the United Kingdom is the only permanent
member of the UN Security Council among them.
Besides accepting the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, in a circumstance when a dispute
has already occurred, the parties may still give their consent ad hoc and have the ICJ hear
the dispute. Generally, the consent will take the form of a special agreement (compormis),
and the parties shall define and address the scope of the dispute and the issues that they
wish to entrust to the Court, and the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to what is designated in
the agreement.45
1.3 The Composition of the Bench
Pursuant to Article 3 of the ICJ Statute, the International Court of Justice consists of
15 judges.46 Each judge shall serve for a term of nine years and may be re-elected.47 To

Court of Justice Jurisdiction in Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L
L. 263 (2009).
44

Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited March 3, 2017).
45

KOLB, supra note 35, at 530.

46

ICJ Statute art. 3.

47

ICJ Statute art. 13. However, there are arguments urging abolishment of the rule permitting re-election

as it is thought that this may enhance judges’ independence and impartiality.
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ensure the balance of the Court and the fairness between the parties, Article 3 of the ICJ
Statute prohibits states from having more than one national serving on the Court.48 Since
all UN member states are ipso facto parties to the ICJ Statute,49 except for the ad hoc
judges, all ICJ judges are elected by the UN members. To be elected, the candidates shall
first be nominated by the national group of their country50 and shall secure an absolute
majority of votes in the two separate voting proceedings held in the UN General Assembly

48

ICJ Statute art. 3. This was for the purpose of avoiding a single nationality being over-represented on the

court. Taslim O. Elias, Report, Does the International Court of Justice, as it is Presently Shaped,
Correspond to the Requirement which Follow from its Function as the Central Judicial Body of the
International Community, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 19, 20 (Hermann Mosler
& Rudolf Bernhardt eds., 1974).
49

UN Charter art. 93(1).

50

ICJ Statute arts. 4–6. Each country has a different set of nomination procedures, including how the

national group functions. For an introduction of U.S.’s nomination process, see Lori F. Damrosch, The
Election of Thomas Buergenthal to the International Court of Justice, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 579 (2000); Lori
F. Damrosch, Ensuring the Best Bench: Ways of Selecting Judges, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDING OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT

165, 191–97 (Connie Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997). However,

Robinson noted that most national groups are not independent of the government’s control, see Davis R.
Robinson, The Role of Politics in the Election and the Work of Judges of the International Court of Justice,
97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 277, 279 (2003).
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and the Security Council.51 As a policy guidance, the electors are advised to ensure that
“the main forms of civilization” and “the principal legal systems of the world” are
represented in the Court.52 However, this goal has never been fully realized.
Although most forms of civilization and principal legal systems of the world are
represented in the ICJ, they are never equally represented. As scholars have observed, the
distribution of ICJ bench seats is based on ‘power and geography’ instead of ensuring the
fair representation of “main forms of civilization or principal legal system of the world.”53
Moreover, there is also a customary practice that guarantees the five permanent members
of the Security Council (P5) are represented in the ICJ.54

51

ICJ Statute arts. 8, 10.

52

Id. art. 9.

53

Bardo Fassbender, Organization of the Court: Article 9, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY

261, 270 (Andreas Zimmerman, Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm

eds., 2006); Robinson, supra note 50, at 278–79.
54

The practice of having super powers in the international adjudication body has been adopted since the

times of the PCIJ. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT, WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 56 (5th edn,
1995). For arguments that P5 states should not be guaranteed a seat in the ICJ, see S. Gozie Ogbodo, An
Overview of the Challenges Facing the International Court of Justice in the 21st Century, 18 ANN. SURV.
INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 107–08 (2012); Suh, supra note 18, at 236; William Samore, National Origins v.
Impartiality Decisions: A Study of World Court Holdings, 34 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 193 (1956). For
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The decision to provide the superpowers a de facto guaranteed seat in the ICJ was out
of the political consideration that the presence of the great powers would help to assure
compliance with the decision and maintain the functions of the Court.55 However, the
contribution of having superpowers on the bench was never proven. Although studies have
reported that parties complied with the ICJ decisions at a high rate,56 none of the studies

arguments that this practice may be abandoned at any time, see Edward McWhinney, Law, Politics and
“Regionalism” in the Nomination and Election of World Court Judges, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1,
13, 17 (1986); Elias, supra note 48, at 26–27 (pointing out the change that happened in the 1967 election.
However, Elias predicts that the increasing number of UN members from the Third World does not
necessarily lead to the result that Western Europe would in the future be under-represented). However, it
should be noted that in the most recent election, Judge Greenwood from the UK failed to be re-elected.
This was the first time that a judge from a P5 state was not elected (between 1967 and 1985, there was also
no ICJ judge from China. However, this was due to the more complicated representation disputes between
Nationalist China in Taiwan (ROC) and Communist China in Mainland China (PRC)). See e.g., Owen
Bowcott, No British judge on world court for first time in its 71-year history, GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/20/no-british-judge-on-world-court-for-first-time-in-its-71year-history (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
55

See ROSENNE, supra note 54, at 56; Robinson, supra note 50, at 278–80; MACKENZIE, MALLESON,

MARTIN & SANDS, supra note 13, at 26; Fassbender, supra note 53, at 282.
56

See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of

Justice, 18 (5) EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 852 (2007); CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

403 (2004); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel,

International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements, 51(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 735 (2007), the
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affirm the correlations between the compliance rate and the appearance of P5 judges on the
bench.
Aside from the five seats de facto guaranteed to the P5 countries, the rest of the seats
are competed for by all others. As we shall later observe, the composition of ICJ’s nonpermanent seats shifted quite dramatically as more newly-independent countries joined the
UN and sought more representation in the UN organs during the 1960s and 1970s.
Nonetheless, the distribution of seats in the ICJ is still distant from the idea of having fair
or equitable representation among the states.
The requirements and qualifications of the ICJ judges are provided in Article 2 of the
ICJ Statute. A qualified candidate must be an individual with (1) high moral standards, (2)
the capacity to ensure the independence of the Court, and (3) the experience of either
serving as a judge at the highest judicial office or a legal advisor with expertise in
international law.57 Based on the contextual interpretation of the ICJ Statute, only national

data used in their research can be found in Compliance with ICJ/PCIJ Decisions on Territorial, River, and
Maritime Issues, 2007 AJPS Web Appendix, http://www.paulhensel.org/comply.html. Cf. Oda, supra note
42, at 264.
57

The first two requirements are subjective and are assessed on an individual basis. KOLB, supra note 35,

at 112.
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judges of the highest juridical office, legal advisors, and academics are qualified candidates;
but in practice, high-ranking diplomats are also considered qualified and are frequently
elected. 58 As Robert Kolb has reported, about half of the ICJ bench is composed of
academics and legal advisors, and national judges and diplomats each hold around 25
percent of the seats.59
Although named as an “international” court, for the first twenty years of its
establishment, the ICJ was more like a “European” court than a world court.60 As Table
2-1 shows, between 1946 and 1964, the majority of the bench was composed of judges
from either Europe or the Americas (including North America, Latin America, and South
America) while judges from Africa and Asia only accounted for a small proportion of the
bench.61 It is evident that the African and Asian countries were under-represented in the

58

Id. at 112.

59

Id.

60

R.P. Anand, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Peaceful Settlement of International

Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1, 9 (Leo Gross ed. 1976) [hereinafter
Anand, Role of ICJ]; R.P. ANAND, The International Court of Justice and Impartiality between Nations, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 73, 113–19 (1969); KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33,
at 104.
61

LYNDELL V. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 52–54 (1979).
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early periods of the Court,62 and this imbalanced regional representation has seriously
frustrated the countries in these regions.63

Table 2-1 Number of Judges from Each Region 1946-196464
Year

1946

1949

1952

1955

1958

1961

1964

Africa

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

Asia

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

America

6

6

6

6

6

5

3

Eastern Europe

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

Western Europe

4

4

4

3

4

4

4

Oceania

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

Coinciding with movements to have the non-western states fairly represented in
international organizations, the Afro-Asian group advocated for altering the ICJ’s

62

MACKENZIE, MALLESON, MARTIN & SANDS, supra note 55, at 27–29; Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 5. This

phenomenon is not necessarily a reflection of bias against African and Asian states, as at that time, many of
these regions were still going through the decolonization process and had not yet gained independence.
KOLB, supra note 35, at 112.
63

Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, From Reluctance to Acquiescence: The Evolving Attitude of African States

Towards Judicial and Arbitral Settlement of Disputes, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 605, ¶ 2.3 (2015);
Bedi, supra note 6, at 183; Anand, Role of ICJ, supra note 60, at 9.
64

The information about ICJ judges is available at the ICJ website, see Members, INTERNATIONAL COURT

OF JUSTICE,

http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2 (last visited March 3, 2017).
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composition.65 Starting from the triennial elections of 1966 and 1969, the ICJ started to
accommodate more African and Asian judges.66 Although the de facto guaranteed seats
for the P5 countries primarily remain unaffected, 67 the non-permanent seats are now
distributed in an equation similar to the ‘equitable geographical distribution’ used in the
Security Council and other UN organs.68

65

ROSENNE, supra note 54, at 56–59; Renata Szafarz, Changing State Attitudes towards the Jurisdiction of

the International Court of Justice, in FORTY YEARS INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: JURISDICTION,
EQUITY AND EQUALITY

1, 26 (Arie Bloed & Pieter van Dijk eds., 1988); Abi-Saab, supra note 6, at 5;

Edward McWhinney, Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures and the International Court of Justice, 65
874 WASH. U. L. Q. 873, 889–90 (1987) (pointing out that the 1966 decision caused the court to be
criticized as “politically biased and prejudiced judgment” and delivered “a white man's decision, rendered
by a white man's tribunal.” P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of
African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, 7 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 159, 178 (1998); Yusuf,
supra note 63, at ¶ 2.2.
66

Fassbender, supra note 53, at 271–73; ROSENNE, supra note 54, at 57–59; Elias, supra note 48, at 23–24

(noticing this was made at the expense of Latin American seats); Bedi, supra note 6, at 183–84.
67

The British judge was not elected in the most recent election. However, it remains unclear if this is an

exceptional instance or will be the new practice as it is still too crude to make the conclusion. See supra
note 54.
68

MACKENZIE, MALLESON, MARTIN & SANDS, supra note 55, at 28–29; Leo Gross, Compulsory

Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 1,
19, 34–43 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987); Elias, supra note 48, at 24. For development of UNSC’s seat
distribution, see U.N. Charter art. 23; United Nations General Assembly, Question of Equitable
34

Since the 1970s, the “equitable geographical distribution” has become the
conventional way to compose the ICJ bench.69 The current arrangement is to have three
judges from Africa, two from Latin America, three from Asia, five from Western Europe
and other states (including states from North America and Oceania), and two from Eastern
Europe (including Russia).70 As shown in Figure 2-1, although the percentages of judges
from African and Asian states together has increased from 13% to 40%, the judges from
Asia and Africa still represent twice as many countries as their European colleagues do.
The equitable distribution arrangement of the ICJ seats does not comfort the dissatisfaction

Representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, GA. Res. 1991 (XVIII), para
3; UN Security Council, Annotated Preliminary List of Items to be Included in the Provisional Agenda of
the Sixty-Third Regular Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/63/100, para 105. Yusuf, supra note
63, at ¶ 2.3.
69

Yusuf, supra note 63, at ¶ 2.3.; Bedi, supra note 6, at 184.

70

MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS ¶ 1.5, at 6 (Philip Sands, Cesare Romano, Ruth

Mackenzie & Yuval Shany eds., 2nd ed. 2010); SHABTAI ROSENNE, ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, WHAT
IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 45 (Terry D. Gill ed., 6th ed. 2003). For discussion of the adequacy of this
arrangement, see Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Judges of the International Court of Justice - Election and
Qualification, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 335, 347 (2001) (arguing that the current distribution of seats on the
court contradicts the purpose of Article 9 of the ICJ Statute).
35

of the under-represented states,71 and these countries still call for expanding the bench to
allow more judges from the under-represented regions to serve on the Court.72

71

William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable

Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 392–93 (2001) (arguing that although equitable
distribution policies play an important role in promoting equality in an unequal world, it may, in fact, be
responsible for the further erosion of this seminal principle since the institutional design of the international
system is to perpetuate the Westphalian balance of power.)
72

This includes having more forms of legal tradition represented in the court. See supra note Janina Satzer,

Explaining the Decreased Use of International Courts – The Case of the ICJ, 3 REV. L. & ECO. 11, 19
(2007).
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Figure 2-1 Distribution of Judge’s Origin (1946, 1966, 1985, 2015)
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1.4 Ad hoc Judges
Another unique institutional arrangement in the ICJ is the ad hoc judge system
inherited from its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). 73

73

KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 111.
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While the ICJ Statute prohibits states from having more than one judge serving on the
bench,74 the ad hoc judge system guarantees that states without a national serving on the
bench may have a judge of its own choice join the bench to equalize the imbalance.75 Thus,
pursuant to Article 31 of the ICJ Statute, the party without a national on the bench may
select a judge of its own choice to join the adjudication of that case. In cases where neither
party has a national on the Court, both parties would have the right to select a judge of their
own choice to join the adjudication of that dispute. Although it is not mandatory for the
party to select an ad hoc judge, it is rare for a party to waive such right.76
The first reason provided for the ICJ to adopt the ad hoc judge system is that this
arrangement could help to mitigate the equality problem if one of the parties has a national

74

ICJ Statute art. 3(1).

75

ICJ Statute arts. 31(2), (3). For the policy consideration behind this article, see Iain Scobbie, “Une

Heresie En Matiere Judiciaire”? The Role of the Judge Ad Hoc in the International Court, 4 L. & PRAC.
INT’L COURTS & TRIBUNALS 421, 422–23 (2005); Schwebel, supra note 18, at 889–90; THOMAS FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 324 (1995).
76

E.g., Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 ICJ 240; Temple of Preah Vihear

(Cambodia v. Thailand) 1961 ICJ 17; Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Netherlands) 1959
I.C.J. 209.
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serving on the Court while the other party does not.77 It was also thought that if the national
judges have a strong tendency to support their own country, states would feel more
comfortable utilizing the Court if they could have a judge of their choice on the bench to
monitor the bench’s deliberation and to ensure that their arguments have been duly
considered.78 Aside from ensuring equality between the parties and encouraging states to
utilize the ICJ, it is thought that the Court would also benefit from having someone
knowledgeable in the municipal laws or certain facts of his/her own country and the ad hoc
judge system may thus enrich the deliberations of the Court.79

77

Suh, supra note 18, at 224; KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 111.

78

Schwebel, supra note 18, at 889–90. This position is advanced by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht in his

dissenting opinion delivered in the Genocide case between Bosnia and Serbia. He indicates that it is the ad
hoc judge’s responsibility to “endeavor to ensure that, so far as is reasonable, every relevant argument in
favour of the party that has appointed him has been fully appreciated in the course of collegial
consideration and, ultimately, is reflected – though not necessarily accepted – in any separate of dissenting
opinion that he may write.” Application of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Provisional Measures, order of 13 Sept. 1993, 1993
I.C.J. 325, 409 (dissenting opinion of judge ad hoc Lauterpacht).
79

See KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 111; SERENA FORLATI, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE, AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OR A JUDICIAL BODY 34 (2014); SINGH, supra note 28, at 193–94.
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The qualification requirements for ad hoc judges are identical to those of regular
judges. Ad hoc judges are also expected to share the same competence and expertise in
international law and perform their duty independently and impartially (though we shall
later observe that they rarely meet such requirement).80 With regard to nationality, the
disputing parties may freely select its own national or a national of a third state for the
position. In practice, states also frequently nominate retired ICJ judges to serve as ad hoc
judges in the case.81
As many studies have pointed out, ad hoc judges and regular judges from the party
states both vote in favor of their home countries and appointers at a high rate82 and are

80

KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 111.

81

For instance, Judge Enrique c. Armand-Ugon of Uruguay who served in the ICJ as regular judge from

1951-1961 was appointed as ad hoc judge by Spain in the Barcelona Traction case; Judge Mohammed
Bedjaoui of Algeria who served in the court as regular judge from 1982-2001 was later appointed as ad hoc
judge in the Diallo case, the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, the
Frontier Dispute between Benin and Niger, and also the case relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms
Race and to Nuclear Disarmament raised by the Marshall Islands.
82

Karin Oellers-Frahm, International Courts and Tribunals, Judges and Arbitrators, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e45?rskey=oHQViJ&result=4&prd=EPIL (last visited March 3, 2017). It was said that the ad hoc judges
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speculated to be biased.83 Although the high tendency of ad hoc judges to support their
appointers attracts concerns about the ad hoc judges’ impartiality84 and ignites discussions

are seriously influenced by the state that nominates them. See “[o]f all influences to which men are subject,
none is more powerful, more persuasive or more subtle than the tie of allegiance that binds them (judges) to
the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honors and performances for which they
are so ready to spend their fortune and to risk their lives.” Fourth Annual Report of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. E), No. 4, at 75 (cited in Suh, supra note 18, at 225).
83

Samore, supra note 54, at 201; Suh, supra note 18, at 225; Hensley, National Bias, supra note 18, at

571–72, 580; Adam Smith, “Judicial Nationalism” in International Law: National Identity and Judicial
Autonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197, 218–20 (2005).
84

See Ogbodo, supra note 54, at 108–09; Suh, supra note 18, at 225. Cf. supra note 18, at 892–95 (arguing

that judges’ preferences for voting for their appointers and against the majority should not be viewed as
suggestive of bias since it has already been proven that the court/majority also makes mistakes over the law
and the facts and may not always be right.)
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of abandoning the ad hoc judge system,85 the system remains intact.86 In Chapter 4, this
dissertation shall provide an updated assessment of the voting preferences of the judges
appointed or nominated by the party states.

85

For discussion that the ad hoc judge system should be abandoned, see Ogbodo, supra note 54, at 108–09;

Weiss, supra note 22, at 124. For arguments that having ad hoc judges on the bench does not affect the
court’s function, primarily taking the position that the votes of party-appointed adjudicators eventually
neutralize one another, see SHABTAI ROSENNE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 1920–
1996 124– 25 (1st edn. 1997); Yuval Shany, Squaring the Circle? Independence and Impartiality of Party
Appointed Adjudicators in International Legal Proceedings, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 490
(2008); Smith, supra note 83, at 204; K. Tanaka, Independence of International Judges, 13
COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 855, 864 (1975).
86

The ad hoc judge system was also adopted by other international courts such as the International

Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea arts. 2, 8, 11 Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; Statute of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights art. 10, O.A.S. Gen. Ass. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), Jan. 1, 1980, available at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/statuteiachr.asp. Of course, some international courts have
abandoned this practice, such as the European Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization dispute
settlement body. For comparison of designs between international courts, see Tom Dannenbaum,
Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption Governing the International
Judiciary and Why it Must Be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 90–101 (2012).
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1.5 The ICJ’s Caseload
A total of 136 cases were submitted to the ICJ in the past seventy years. The Court
delivered decisions over 101 of them;87 24 cases were discontinued and removed before
any adjudication take place. As of 2015, eleven cases are still pending. Statistics relating
to the ICJ’s usage since 1946 are shown in Figure 2-2.88
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Figure 2-2 ICJ Filings - Number of Cases Filed
In Figure 2-2, the bars show the number of cases filed in a given year, which range
from 0 to 17; the dashed line shows the two-year moving average. Despite the decrease in

87

Data was last updated on 24 March 2015.

88

Data available at the ICJ website, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last visited

March 1, 2017).
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usage between the 1960s and 1980s, the ICJ’s caseload increased drastically during the late
1980s. From an overall perspective, the average number of cases submitted to the ICJ is
increasing. But just as Eric Posner and Janina Satzer argued, the trend shown in Figure 22 is somewhat deceptive since the usage of ICJ is evaluated without eliminating cases that
are later revoked by the parties and those that arise out of the same incident but are counted
multiple times due to separate proceedings being initiated by the parties.89 Hence, after
taking the factors mentioned above into consideration, the adjusted observation over the
ICJ’s usage is shown in Figures 2-3.
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Figure 2-3 ICJ Filings Adjusted – duplicated and removed cases

89

Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

RESOLUTION 111 (Stefan Voigt, Max Albert, and Dieter Schmidtchen eds. 2006)..
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In Figure 2-3, the data is adapted to exclude the cases that were submitted to the ICJ
but later removed by the parties, and also the cases that arose out of the same incident but
became separate cases. From Figure 2-3, a U-shape trend over the ICJ’s usage shows that
the number of cases submitted to the ICJ significantly decreased during the 1960s but later
recovered in the late 1980s. Although the observation still shows that the usage of ICJ has
increased in the past two decades, the trend is not as exaggerated as we see in Figure 2-2.90

90

Satzer also argues that the number of UN members should be taken into consideration when evaluating

the usage. In her argument, if the number of cases submitted to the ICJ did not increase along with the
expansion of its potential users, this signals a decline of the ICJ’s importance. Other factors that can be
considered are discussed in Satzer’s research, see Satzer, supra note 72, at 21–33. However, I disagree with
Satzer’s idea. The logic of setting the number of UN members as an adjustment factor is based on the
assumption that a positive correlation exists between the number of UN members and the number of
interstate disputes. However, there lacks evidence proving the existence of such positive correlation and
this assumption should not be sustained. Also, the newly established regional and specialized international
tribunals such as the European Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body,
and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea established in the1990s also compete with the ICJ and
may also have caused the usage of the ICJ to decrease. Accordingly, unless one can prove the positive
correlation between the numbers of UN members and the number of interstate disputes and also evaluate
the impact of the other international courts, I believe it is not necessary to take the increase in UN
membership into consideration.
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1.6 The Composition of the ICJ’s Caseload
To assess the type of cases most frequently submitted to the ICJ, I replicate the
categorization methods used in Tom Ginsburg and Richard McAdams’ research.91 The
contentious cases are disaggregated into the following seven categories: (1) Aerial
Incident, 92 (2) Territorial/Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 93 (3) Property Rights

91

See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 24. This categorization method is also used by Posner and

Figueiredo, see Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the Intemational Court of Justice Biased?,
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, (2005).
92

For example, the case of Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 between Pakistan and India, or the Lockerbie

case between Libya and United Kingdom.
93

For example, the North Sea Continental Shelf case between Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, or

the case of Temple of Preah Vihear between Cambodia and Thailand.
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(including Diplomatic Protection),94 (4) Trusteeship,95 (5) Use of force,96 (6) Diplomatic
Relation,97 and (7) Other.98

Table 2-2 Types of Cases Referred to the ICJ99
Type of Dispute

94

Number of Cases

Aerial Incidents

4

Territorial/ Boundary Delimitation

31

Property Rights

12

Trusteeship

5

Use of force

28

Diplomatic Relations

9

Other

14

For example, the Ambatielos case between Greece and the United Kingdom, or the Nottebohm case

between Liechtenstein and Guatemala.
95

For example, the South West Africa case between Liberia, Ethiopia and South Africa, or the Northern

Cameroons case between Cameroon and United Kingdom.
96

For example, the Corfu Channel between the United Kingdom and Albania, the Nicaragua case between

Nicaragua and the United States, or Use of Force case between Serbia and the NATO states.
97

For example, the LaGrand case between Germany and United States, or the Asylum case between

Colombia and Peru.
98

For example, the Nuclear Test case between France, New Zealand and Australia, or the Gabcikovo-

Nagymaros Project case between Hungary and Slovakia.
99

Our data includes twenty-six more cases than the Ginsburg and McAdam study and twenty-nine cases

more when compared with Posner and Figueiredo’s research.
47

As Table 2-2 shows, territorial demarcation and use of force disputes are the two types
of cases most frequently submitted to the ICJ for adjudication. However, because 10 of the
28 cases relating to the use of force related to NATO’s action in the Balkan conflicts during
the 1990s, the number of use of force cases observed is inflated.100 But even after the
adjustment is made, use of force cases are still the second most frequent cases seen in the
ICJ docket. Moreover, in the past two decades, except for the East Timor case,101 no cases
relating to aerial incidents and trusteeship issues have been brought before the ICJ. In short,
territorial/maritime demarcation issues are the only type of case that was constantly
referred to the ICJ throughout the Court’s history.
2. The Research Question: Is the decision-making of the ICJ and its judges
influenced by extra-legal factors?
In the past seventy years, the ICJ has delivered more than one hundred decisions over
contentious cases and requests for advisory opinions. The Court’s contribution to the

100

This number will be adjusted in a later part of the dissertation when we observe the usage and

popularity of the ICJ.
101

East Timor (Portugal v. Aus.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90.
48

development of international law is widely recognized. 102 Nevertheless, the ICJ’s
performance does not share the same compliment. As Gary Born commented, considering
its usage and the ineffectiveness of its jurisdiction, “it is impossible to conclude that the
ICJ has played a significant role in international affairs over the course.” 103 However,
among the many criticisms that ICJ faces,104 the one that fundamentally challenges its

102

See e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the

Instance of National Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 495, 499 (1988); Robert Y. Jennings, The United Nations at
Fifty: The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT’ L. 493, 493 (1995); Manfred
Lachs, Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of
International Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 245 (1983)
103

Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 805, 807–08 (2012).

See also Posner, supra note 89; Satzer, supra note 72. Cf. Llamzon, supra note 56, at 852 (arguing that
“pessimism regarding the future of the Court is entirely unwarranted, so long as expectations are managed
realistically.”)
104

This includes the efficiency of the court, the effectiveness of the court, problems enforcing the court’s

judgment, etc. See generally SCHULTE, supra note 56, at 403; Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final
Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987, 98(3) AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 460 (2004); JOHN
COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCEDURES 178 (2000); Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 24. For studies on pre-1978 compliance, See
Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of NonAppearance, Non- Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A
CROSSROADS 288, 296, 300 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
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legitimacy is the concern that the ICJ and its judges’ are biased and partial, and that the
decision-making of the Court is influenced by extra-legal factors. It is also reported that
the impartiality concerns have undermined states’ willingness to utilize the ICJ as a dispute
settlement forum.105
As in domestic courts, judicial impartiality and independence are crucial to
maintaining the legitimacy of international tribunals.106 However, skepticism about the
impartiality of judges serving on the ICJ or its predecessor, the PCIJ, is no new news. In
1933, Hersch Lauterpacht first cautioned that the judges serving in the international court
may not be as impartial as expected, as he observed that the PCIJ judges showed a high

105

See Elias, supra note 48, at 22–28; Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of

Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 300–01, 303–04, 312–14 (1997); See e.g.,
Anand, Role of ICJ, supra note 60, at 2–3; Richard Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21
INT’L ORG. 1 (1967). Cf. Hambro’s opinion in the Symposium on the Judicial Settlement of International
Disputes, see JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 57 (Hermann Mosler & Rudolf
Bernhardt eds., 1974).
106

YUVAL SHANY, Judicial Independence and Impartiality, in ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

INTERNATIONAL COURTS 97, 104 (2014); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 914 (2005);
Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 271 (2003)
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tendency to support their own country whenever they were parties to the dispute.107 A
separate study conducted by Manley Hudson in 1943 over the PCIJ judges’ voting
preferences reached a similar conclusion and reported that the PCIJ judges tended to hold
contentions similar to the positions of their governments or the states that appointed
them.108
The speculation held against the World Court did not fade away as the ICJ replaced
the PCIJ in 1946. States continued to have doubts about the ICJ’s impartiality and
distrusted the judges serving in new institution.109 The Soviet Union’s attitude towards the
ICJ is a classic example of those who have doubts in the ICJ. Throughout the ICJ’s history,
the Communist states showed no enthusiasm for utilizing international court(s) for dispute

107

LAUTERPACHT, supra note 17, at 230–32.

108

MANLEY HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942 355 (1943)

109

The U.S. Secretary of the State Elihu Root once stated that: “[t]he great obstacle to universal adoption

of arbitration … is rather the apprehension that the tribunal selected will not be impartial.” Quoted in
Edward Gordon et al., The Independence and Impartiality of International Judges, 83 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 508, 508 (1989). After the Permanent Court of International Justice was replaced by the International
Court of Justice, the speculation that the judges were biased remained. See KITCHELL, supra note 8, 103–11
(arguing that the “Communist judges are disciplined servants of the Communist party”, thus, if the United
States’ accedes to the jurisdiction of the court, its interests may be endangered).
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settlement purposes.110 It has further been pointed out that the Soviets felt that they would
be in a disadvantaged position if they were to appear before a court primarily composed of
Western European judges. 111 The Soviet countries not only rejected international
adjudication because they felt that “only an angel could be unbiased in judging Russian
affairs,”112 their anxiety also stemmed from the Marxist-Leninist teaching which indicates
that there will be an inevitable “conflict between social orders built on different class
structures and economic interest”113 and the ICJ would eventually be the continuation of

110

Elena E. Vilegjanina, The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: A New Soviet Approach, in

PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT ANGLO-SOVIET APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
119, 120 (Anthony Carty & Gennady Danilenko eds. 1990).
111

Zigurds L. Zile, A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Krylov’s

Jurisprudential Legacy, 58(2) AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 364–65 (1964); Arthur W. Rovine, The National
Interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE VOL. I 313, 315
(Leo Gross ed. 1976); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 53–70 (1981); McWhinney, supra note 65, at 877–78. In the
This distrust over the non-Soviet judges even extended to international adjudication between private
parties, see Samuel Pisar, The Communist System of Foreign-Trade Adjudication, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1413–15 (1959).
112

Litvinov’s Statement at the Conference on Russian Affairs, The Hague, July 12, 1922, in LOUIS B.

SOHN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORLD LAW 1046 (1950).
113

Zile, supra note 111, at 364–65.
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the “imperialist voting machine” in the United Nations.114 As Zigurds Zile observed, most
Soviet international legal scholars commonly took the viewpoint that “the reactionary
classes will … manipulate the institution of international adjudication to their advantage
and against historical progress.”115
Perhaps because of adhering to the same Marxist-Leninist teaching, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) holds a similar attitude against international adjudication.116 The
PRC revoked the Republic of China (ROC) government’s acceptance of the ICJ’s

114

Galina G. Shinkaretskaya, International Arbitration in the External Policy of the Soviet Union, in

PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT ANGLO-SOVIET APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
110, 113 (Anthony Carty & Gennady Danilenko eds. 1990); POLIANSKY, MEZHDUNARODNYI SUD [THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT] 233 (1951) (cited in Zile, supra note 111, at 367); see also Korovin,
Mezhdunarodnyi sud na sluzhbe anglo-amerikanskogo imperializma [The International Court in the
Service of Anglo-American Imperialism], SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [THE SOVIET STATE AND
LAW] 57 (1950) (cited in Shabtai Rosenne, The Role Of The International Court of Justice in Inter-State
Relations Today, 20 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 275, 288 (1987); Lisovsky, Mezhdunarodnoe
pravo [International Law] 150 (1955) (cited in Zile, supra note 111, at 367).
115

Zile, supra note 111, at 367.

116

See Zhao Haifeng (赵海峰), Zhongguo yu Guoji Sifa Jigou Guanxi de Jiangzuo (中国与国际司法机构

的演进) [Evolution of the Relationship Between China and International Judicial Organizations], 26 FAXUE
PINGLUN (法学评论) [WUHAN UNI. L. REV.] 3 (2008); JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1444 (1974).
53

compulsory jurisdiction soon after it prevailed in the struggle against the ROC to become
the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations. The PRC has also never
presented itself as a party before the ICJ. Among Chinese academics, even prestigious
Chinese international law scholars like Zao Lihai and Wang Tieya – who later served as
judges of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – also published and criticized the
international courts for being biased and partial.117
During the decolonization period, another set of frustrations arose from the AfroAsian states. 118 Aside from dissatisfied about being underrepresented in the Court, 119
frustration accumulated after the deliverance of the 1966 South West Africa decision120
where the ruling of the ICJ limited the states’ ability to sue former colonial powers for their
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maladministration.121 Because the ICJ was thought to be too conservative, and perhaps too
pro-western, to support the claims advanced by the developing countries,122 this concern
again links back to the problem that non-European/American countries are
underrepresented in the ICJ and have thus been made to feel vulnerable and disadvantaged
when they litigate against any colonial counterparts in the ICJ.123 As Professor Abi-Saab
observes, the 1966 South West Africa case turned out to be ‘the disaster of 1966’ and
shattered the developing and Third World countries’ confidence in the Court.124
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In the 1980s, a new skepticism about the ICJ being biased against the United States
and the western powers emerged. Following the Nicaragua decision where the United
States’ actions in Nicaragua were found to be in violation of international law by the ICJ,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, then the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, publicly
challenged the impartiality of the ICJ and stated that the ICJ judges reflect the political bias
and proclivities found in the political organs of the UN. 125 Scholars like Edward
McWhinney and Gregory Raymond also argue that an “anti-Western” bias emerged in the
ICJ as the judges’ philosophies shifted to challenge the rules of international law favored
by powerful states.126
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Although politicians and scholars have repeatedly charged the ICJ judges with being
biased and have deemed their decisions to be influenced by extra-legal factors,127 most of

International Court of Justice, 2 CONN. J. INT’L L. 397, 397–98 (1987); Weiss, supra note 22, 123–33.
Adede observed that the Nicaragua case brought African states to the ICJ as the case signaled the ICJ’s
willingness to rule against a superpower. See Adede, supra note 6, at 55; However, this confidence was
again diminished after the Lockerbie case, see id. at 58.
127

For scholarships on the impartiality and bias of ICJ judges, see e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo,

Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005); Davis R. Robinson,
Politics and Law in International Adjudication, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 277, 280–81 (2003) (using
the Gulf of Maine case as reference to claim that the disputing parties may prefer to have a case adjudicated
only by judges that they mutually agree on to avoid the possibility that non-party-state judges may consider
their own nation’s interests in the outcome of a dispute between other states); Edward Gordon et al., supra
note 109, at 519 (Richard Falk indicates that in the Nicaragua case, it is clear that the opinions expressed by
U.S. Judge Stephen Schwebel are unpersuasive and the evidence he uses are handouts from the U.S.
government); Zile, supra note 111 (questioning the Soviet Judge Krylov’s opinions often reflect the idea of
its government); Eberhard P. Deutsch, A Plan for Reconstitution of the International Court of Justice, 49(6)
A.B.A. J. 537, 539-40 (1963). Contrarily, some hold that the ICJ is independent and believe that
adjudication by the Court ensures the greatest degree of impartial consideration of an international dispute
on the basis of law. See Christopher Greenwood, The Role of the International Court of Justice in the
Global Community, 17(2) U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 233, 248 (2011); Manfred Lachs, To the Editor
In Chief: American Journal of International Law, August 17, 1989, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 231 (1990); Leo
Gross, Some Observations on the International Court of Justice, 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 33 (1962); However,
Gross admits that during the judge election process, voting blocs and geopolitics do come into play, see
Leo Gross The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the
57

these allegations derive from observations of a single case like the Nicaragua case or the
South West Africa case and lack the support of concrete evidence. Because these unproven
allegations seriously denounced the reputation of the ICJ and may have also affected states’
willingness to utilize the ICJ, there is a pressing need to address these concerns empirically.
Across the ICJ’s history, only a handful of studies have tried to sketch and record the
ICJ judges’ voting behaviors through an empirical approach. However, due to the limited
power of the analytical methods deployed, they were unable to report a comprehensive and
satisfactory observation of the ICJ judges’ voting behavior. Thus, it is the intent of this
dissertation to supplement the scholarship over the performance of the ICJ through
conducting an empirical study of its judges’ voting behaviors.
In this dissertation, I aim to report on the voting blocs formed by the judges, to observe
the potential political behavior reflected in the judges’ decision-making, and also to
determine the factors that correlate with the ICJ judges’ voting patterns. With the help of
cluster analysis, I shall visualize the judges’ voting patterns and observe if the distribution
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of the ICJ judges’ votes reflects the contentions between the East and West, the North and
South, or the political divisions reported in the UN General Assembly voting records, and
shall observe the voting blocs that emerge across different periods and types of cases. With
the help of regression analysis, this dissertation aims to identify the variables and factors
that correlate with the ICJ judges voting behavior.
3. Literature Review
As there is a rich literature on the ICJ’s establishment, its function, its procedural and
evidentiary rules, its decisions on specific issues, and the enforcement and compliance of
its decisions,128 this section will only review the literature that empirically assesses the ICJ
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judges’ voting behaviors. Based on the issues discussed, these prior studies that have
assessed ICJ judges’ voting preference or patterns can be further divided into two
categories.
The first set of literature assesses the voting behavior of judges from party states
(including ad hoc judges) with the aim to examine if the party state judges are keen to
support their government whenever they are parties to the dispute. In particular, this set of
studies aims to address how nationality or appointee-appointor relationships serve as a
linkage connecting the judges and their home countries/appointors and how this connection
may affect the judges’ judicial behavior.129 The second set of research that assesses the
ICJ judges’ voting patterns looks more broadly at the voting behavior of all judges with
the goal of identifying the alignments formed between the judges. Studies have also
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attempted to examine how political alignments and ideological similarities between the
judges’ home countries are reflected in the co-voting behaviors between the ICJ judges.
3.1 Literature on National Bias and the Voting Behavior of Party State Judges
(a) William Samore’s 1956 study
After Lauterpacht and Hudson showed that the judges from party states serving in the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) were keen to vote in favor of their home
country and may not have performed their duties impartially, 130 William Samore
continued to study the ICJ and PCIJ judges’ voting patterns in 1956. Of all the previous
literature on this subject, Samore was the first to use statistical figures to indicate how the
ICJ judges nominated and appointed by disputing parties (generally referred to as “national
judges”) have frequently voted in favor of their appointors or nominators.131
Samore’s project assesses national judges’ votes in 42 contentious cases and 13
advisory opinions delivered by the PCIJ and ICJ between 1922 and 1955.132 The goal of
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the project was to observe the difference between the voting patterns of national judges
and the rest of the bench. In this research, Samore reports that regular and ad hoc judges
both voted for the states that nominated or appointed them approximately 80 percent of the
time; among which, regular judges supported their home countries at a rate of 69 percent
and ad hoc judges supported their appointors at a rate of 90 percent.133 Samore also notes
that no ad hoc judge had ever issued a dissenting opinion against a judgment that ruled in
favor of its appointor while regular judges had twice done so.134
In sum, Samore argues that the national judges’ preference for supporting their own
country “cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence” and that the sentiment of nationality
may have influenced the national judges’ decision-making.135 While Samore admits that
the two party state judges’ votes are likely to counter-balance one another, his primary
concern is that unfairness would appear in situations when the dispute involves multiple
parties and the two disputing groups do not have an equal numbers of judges on the bench.
In circumstances when one party has multiple regular judges serving on the Court while
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the opposite party does not have the same number of regular judges on the bench and is
only allowed to appoint one ad hoc judge, this obviously leaves the party that has fewer
judges on the bench in a disadvantaged position.136
As Samore reports, the problem of having an unbalanced bench has already appeared
in cases like S.S. Wimbledon and Monetary Gold. 137 In the more recent case where
Serbia/Yugoslavia sued the NATO states for their military actions in the Balkans during
the 1990s, because the defendant group, the NATO countries, had five regular judges
serving on the bench, the fact that Yugoslavia/Serbia was given the right to appoint an ad
hoc judge of its preference did not counter-balance the tilted scale. It is apparent that the
NATO states were in an advantageous position for having more judges serving on the
bench.
Lastly, although Samore admits that it is nearly impossible for a court to obtain
absolute impartiality, he still urges the ICJ’s institutional design be adjusted to ensure
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fairness between the parties. The Court should reduce, if not eliminate, the chance of
leaving the case to a bench of partial judges.138
(b) Thomas Hensley’s 1968 research
The next comprehensive survey of the ICJ judges’ national bias was Thomas
Hensley’s 1968 research. 139 With data covering ICJ’s contentious cases and advisory
decisions on 54 claims between 1946 and 1964, Hensley’s dataset includes 638 votes cast
by the ICJ judges.140
Hensley reports that in contentious cases, the votes of judges from or appointed by
party states deviate from the votes of other Court members by 44 and 22 percentage
points, 141 and the voting records for the advisory opinions report similar deviations.
Accordingly, Hensley argues that the judges from party states are biased and such national
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bias affects the judges’ decision-making. By highlighting the difference between the voting
patterns of the national judges and the other members of the Court, Hensley concludes that
in addition to nationality allegiance (national bias),142 the judges’ voting preference might
also be affected by the cultural values and the national interests of their home country, and
also the ICJ judges’ selection process. 143 Furthermore, while the ad hoc judges were
observed to show greater support to their appointer, Hensley argues that ad hoc judges
display a much stronger bias than the other judges.144
(c) Il Suh’s 1969 study
In 1969, with data consisting of 54 contentious cases and 9 advisory opinions in which
national judges have participated,145 Il Suh reexamined the national judges’ preference to
vote in favor of their appointers.146 In addition to statistically observing if national judges
show a strong preference in voting for their country, Suh also qualitatively scrutinizes if
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the national judges’ votes echo the contentions expressed by the judges’ home countries to
examine if the judges’ opinions align with the positions of their government.
Based on the data, Suh finds that regular judges disagree with their governments more
than ad hoc judges do. Accordingly, Suh concludes that regular judges show a greater sense
of responsibility toward their judicial duties than the ad hoc judges since they are less keen
to support their governments.147 Nevertheless, in average, Suh still reports that the national
judges voted for their governments around 82 percent of the time.148 While Suh agrees that
the judges’ voting behaviors may be influenced by the national interests of their home
countries, he concludes that these impacts are limited since the ICJ decisions are rarely
reached by close votes. In sum, Suh concludes that the voting preferences of the national
judges do not threaten the harmony of international justice.149
(d) Adam Smith’s 2005 study
36 years after Suh’s study, in 2005, Adam Smith revisited the question concerning the
impartiality of ICJ’s national judges.150 The analysis methods used in Smith’s research are
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identical to Il Suh’s work, the only difference being that Smith addresses the question with
updated data.151
Empirically, Smith’s findings are not very different from the previous scholarship.
Smith also reports that the judges voted in line with the national interests of their
government around 80 percent of the time when their home country was a party to the
dispute. 152 The ad hoc judges are also found to show even greater support for their
nominators than the regular judges.153 Because the ratio of national judges voting against
their government has gradually increased from 18 to 24 percent,154 Smith argues that this
is an indication of the growth of ICJ judges’ independence and that the governments have
gradually lost their influence over the judges.155
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Additionally, Smith reports a decrease in voting agreements between the judges from
Western Europe and those from Russia after the end of the Cold War.156 On such basis,
Smith argues that the ideological chasm between the East and West is not the dominating
factor influencing judges voting behavior; otherwise the voting agreement between the
judges from the East and the West should have increased instead of decreased after the end
of the Cold War.157 In sum, Smith argues that the growing awareness and recognition of
international legal ethics and the creation of the community of international jurists has all
helped to prevent nationality bias to gain real influence in the chamber and the impartiality
of the ICJ is thus secured.158
(e) Eric Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo: What are the variables influencing ICJ judges’
voting behavior?
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Eric Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo’s work published in 2005 is by far the most
comprehensive study of the individual ICJ judges’ voting behavior. 159 Aside from
assessing the national judges’ preferences for voting for their home country, Posner and de
Figueiredo’s study also aims to assess if ICJ judges vote for countries that share strategic
interests with the judges’ home country.160
In the observations regarding the national judges’ voting preferences, Posner and de
Figueiredo report that the judges from non-party states showed no particular preferences
in voting for the applicant nor the respondent, but the judges from party states voted for
their appointers about 90 percent of the time.161 Although the numbers reported in Posner
and de Figueiredo’s study are slightly different from Smith’s,162 they nevertheless provide
consistent evidence showing national judges’ strong preference for voting for their
appointer.
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With regard to the question of what factors are likely to influence the ICJ judges’
voting preferences, Posner and de Figueiredo use regression analysis to observe if judges
voted more for states that share strategic interests with their home country. In other words,
instead of observing the voting clusters through comparing judges’ actual votes, Posner
and de Figueiredo categorized the judges into social and political groups based on the
characteristics of their country of origin and observed if the judges are keen to vote for
countries that share social and political connections with the judges’ home country. The
types of alignment tested in Posner and de Figueiredo’s analysis include regional, political,
and military collaboration, alignment in international organizations, common language and
culture shared between the judges’ home countries, and the similarity between the states’
degree of democracy and wealth.163
Based on the regression analysis results, Posner and de Figueiredo report that the
judges are likely to vote for the party that shares a closer degree of wealth and level of
democracy with his or her home country.164 Their study also reports that judges are more
apt to support the party that practices the same religion or shares a common language with
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his or her home country.165 However, surprisingly, geographical, political and military
alignments are reported as weak factors in influencing judges’ voting preference, and
Posner and de Figueiredo conclude that “the safest conclusion is that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that judges are not biased by NATO and regional matches.”166
3.2 Literature on ICJ Judges’ Group Voting Behaviors
(a) Thomas Hensley: What are the voting blocs in the ICJ?
In 1978, Hensley published his second empirical study assessing the ICJ’s impartiality.
This time, the research question centered on the bloc voting behaviors within the Court.167
In the research, Hensley uses the Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis method to calculate
voting agreements between pairs of judges and then identifies pairs of judges that have
frequently agreed with one another.168
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Hensley’s research data include the ICJ judges’ voting records over 81 nonunanimous claims from both contentious cases and advisory opinions. Using the RiceBeyle analysis method, Hensley identifies several voting blocs within the ICJ. The largest
bloc identified in Hensley’s study consists of three Western European judges from Belgium,
Norway, and France.169 Based on the geographical and political ideology connections,
Hensley reports that the judges from Latin American and Communist states also formed
into separate blocs.170 In general, the judges from Western European states also share a
prominent level of agreement with each other.171
Although Hensley’s research identifies several voting blocs consisting of judges from
countries sharing similar political, cultural, or geographical characteristics, some of the
blocs that he identifies consist of judges from countries with weak cultural and political
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connections. While Hensley’s study suggests that the political or cultural ties between the
countries may be one of the factors causing the judges to form into alignments, his analysis
nevertheless indicates that political alignment and cultural similarity between the judges’
home countries do not necessarily transform into an alignment among the judges. 172
Moreover, as Hensley finds that the judges from countries with the same legal traditions
do not share higher levels of agreement than those from foreign legal traditions, he argues
that legal traditions are not an influential factor affecting judges’ voting behavior.173 In
sum, Hensley reports that there are significant differences between the voting patterns of
the judges from Western European states and those from Communist states,174 and such
difference is especially noticeable when the case relates to Cold War issues.175
(b) G. Terry: Do conservative judges dominate the ICJ?
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After the 1966 South West Africa case, G. Terry assessed the newly arising complaint
that the Court is dominated by conservative judges and judges oriented towards the status
quo to maintain the power and rights of the Western powers.176 Using statistical analysis
to compare the ICJ’s works between 1945-1951 and 1961-1967, Terry aims to answer two
questions held against the ICJ: First, is there persistent alignment between the ICJ judges?
If so, what does this alignment looks like and what are the dominating groups within the
Court? Second, what are the factors influencing the judges to be conservative or
progressive?177
Terry analyzed the ICJ judges’ votes and opinions in 22 contentious cases and
advisory opinions both quantitatively and qualitatively.178 Because Terry finds that the
vast majority of ICJ judges take approaches on both ends of the progressive and
conservative spectrum, and only very few judges are consistent in being on either
spectrum, 179 he argues that the allegations that conservative judges dominated the ICJ
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were groundless. 180 Also, while the statistical findings indicate that the judges from
Communist countries agree with those from Communist and non-Communist countries at
a similar rate, Terry challenges the traditional speculation that the judges from Communist
states consistently align with each other and confront the judges from NATO states.181
Terry’s finding of non-alignment among Communist judges also runs contrary to
Hensley’s 1978 research in which Hensley argues that there is a significant difference
between the voting patterns of Western European and Communist judges over Cold War
issues.182
Lastly, Terry also identifies a voting bloc consisting of seven judges — mostly from
Western European states183 — that consistently share high voting agreement with each
other between 1945 and 1961. Although Terry was unable to identify the mechanism
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motivating these seven judges to share high agreement with one another184, the finding that
these seven judges “supplied the core of the majority on virtually all of the cases before the
Court” for 16 years still indicates how the ICJ may be predominated by particular groups
of judges.185
(c) Edith Weiss: Are the ICJ anti-U.S. and pro-developing countries?
Following the 1984 and 1986 Nicaragua decisions,186 a new speculation that the ICJ
was anti-U.S. and pro-developing countries emerged.187 In response to this rising rumor,
Edith Weiss addressed the question using statistical analysis methods and believes that
since “the question of judicial independence and impartiality is in significant part an
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empirical one,” 188 any sustained bias (against the U.S. or other countries) should be
detectable by the statistical analysis methods.189
In her study, Weiss identifies several cohesive voting patterns in the ICJ. For instance,
Weiss reports that between 1966 and 1975, the judges from U.S., West Germany, U.K.,
and Uruguay all voted alike whenever they were on the bench together.190 Similar cohesive
voting patterns were also found between the judges from USSR, Italy, Japan, and India.191
Nonetheless, despite finding some similar voting patterns among the ICJ judges, Weiss
concludes that no significant regional or political voting alignment can be identified.192 In
her observation, there are neither voting blocs formed by the developed or the developing
states, nor any blocs formed by the NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries.193 In contrast to
the persistent voting alignment found among countries in the UN General Assembly voting
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record,194 Weiss reports no similar alignment among the ICJ judges and thus concludes
that the ICJ functioned impartially and independently.195
3.3 Brief Conclusion
To briefly conclude, in the studies assessing the voting preferences of the party-state
judges, scholars have consistently reported that these national judges have a strong
preference to vote in favor of their own country. Among the national judges, ad hoc judges
are found to show greater keenness to vote in favor of their appointers than the regular
judges from party states. Despite the fact that most studies indicate this voting preference
as a form of ‘bias,’ scholars do not think this ‘bias’ would affect the function or the
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impartiality of the entire Court.196 In Posner and de Figueiredo’s research, they conclude
that ICJ judges are more likely to vote for countries that are in the same economic
development status as the judges’ home country. However, they also report that no
significant alignment can be identified between the judges on the basis of NATO
membership or regional matches.197
With regard to whether there are voting blocs or ideology confrontations in the ICJ,
the findings were split and inconclusive. While Hensley and Smith’s research asserts that
Communist and Western European blocs exist in the Court198 and that the judges from
Eastern Europe voted distinctively from the others,199 Terry and Weiss’s studies argue to
the contrary. In their research, both Terry and Weiss conclude that no observable alignment
or blocs can be found among the ICJ judges,200 and the ICJ functioned impartially.
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4. The Limitations and Flaws of the Previous Studies

Based on the literature review provided above, we can see that the prior studies’
findings on the ICJ judges’ bloc voting behaviors remain inconclusive and contradict one
another. In addition to the inconclusive observations of the judges’ collective voting
behaviors, I would like to point out two additional problems that appeared in these prior
studies:
(a) The judges’ voting behavior was analyzed in an ahistorical manner
First, previous studies’ failure to consider the time and historical background as a
factor influencing the ICJ judges’ voting behavior is problematic. As these earlier studies
emphasized observing how interstate relationships are likely to affect the judges’ voting
preferences, they must also realize that international political and economic relations
between states are not static variables but change rapidly in response to the shifts in the
dynamic world. The earlier studies’ decisions to neglect the social and political changes in
history bear the problem of oversimplifying the analysis and thus create a weakness in
detecting how the change of external factors correlates with the judges’ changing voting
behaviors.
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Among all of the studies, Terry and Smith are the only two scholars that have taken
time as a factor and compared the judges’ voting behaviors between different time periods.
However, as Terry’s research is limited to examining the judges’ voting patterns in two
periods (between 1945-1951 and 1961-1967), the apparent weakness embedded is that
Terry’s study lacks comprehensiveness and its findings may no longer be accurate for
describing the current practices happening in the ICJ today.
As to Smith’s research, aside from the fact that his research only observes the party
state judges’ voting behaviors, Smith’s decision to compile the data in an ahistorical
manner also hinders the correctness of his data. For example, when Smith classifies
countries into different political groups, he falsely classifies China as a member of the
Eastern (Communist) bloc201 and fails to notice that the Republic of China (Democratic
China) was the government representing China in the first 25 years of the UN. Additionally,
the first two Chinese judges that served in the ICJ – Judge Hsu Mo and Judge Wellington
Koo – were also both nominated by the Nationalist government. Therefore Smith’s
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inaccurate categorizations, like viewing China only as a Communist state, would certainly
affect the correctness of his further analysis.
The problem of assessing the voting data in an ahistorical manner also appears in the
work of Posner and de Figueiredo, who did not take history and time as factors and
analyzed all voting blocs across the entire Court’s history. Also because of this ahistorical
analysis design, Posner and de Figueiredo’s study may only be able to identify voting
behaviors that are noticeable throughout the ICJ’s history and may not detect voting blocs
that are only significant in a particular historical period. For example, because the tensions
between the judges from colonial powers and those from previously colonized states
mainly arise in the 1960s, it is highly possible that Posner and de Figueiredo’s research
would not detect confrontation between these judges since they only existed in the
designated period.202
(b) Previous studies failed to demonstrate the actual voting clusters existing in the ICJ
Second, because of the constraints of the ICJ’s institutional design and the analytical
methods used, no prior study was able to observe voting agreements between “all judges”
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across the Court’s history. In the studies that observe the voting blocs in the ICJ, most of
them measure the closeness between the judges’ voting patterns by calculating the rate of
voting agreement between the judges. The most common formula used is to divide the
number of instances that two judges cast the same vote by the number of instances that the
judges have the chance to vote together.203 The index of agreement calculated under the
Rice-Beyle analysis used in Hensley and Terry’s work adheres to a similar idea. 204
However, the inherent limitation of measuring the similarity between the judges' votes
through voting agreement is that this analytical method can only describe the closeness
between judges that have co-voting experience. In circumstances when the two judges
never voted together, the voting agreement analysis method is no longer capable of
describing the similarity between the voting patterns of these two judges.
In the past 70 years, 106 regular judges from 49 countries have served in the ICJ. If
the rate of voting agreement between regular judges is calculated by lumping the judges by
their country of origin, there should be a 49*49 matrix, or a 106*106 matrix if the judges
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are paired individually. As not all judges have the chance to decide cases together, either
because they serve on the bench in different time-periods or because no dispute is referred
to the Court when they are together on the bench, this creates a problem in calculating the
degree of agreement between these judges. This incalculable voting agreement thus turns
into missing cells in the matrix and creates an obstacle for comparing the voting
preferences between all Court members.
In the next chapter, this dissertation illustrates the research and analytical method we
use to assess the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors, and explains how this dissertation shall
avoid the problems and issues that we have observed in prior studies’ data compiling or
analysis processes.
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Research Methods and Expected Results

In Chapter 2, I have pointed out that the interest of this dissertation lies in assessing
the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors empirically. In the first part of Chapter 3, I shall explain
why this dissertation assesses the research questions with statistical analysis methods and
how the data used in this research was collected and coded. The second and third parts of
Chapter 3 illustrate the research methods used in this dissertation and also the expected
contributions and limitations of this study.

1. Research Design and Goals
1.1 The Research Design and the Reasons for Conducting Quantitative Analyses
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the speculations and criticisms challenging the ICJ’s
impartiality and independence have accompanied it throughout its history. Although these
accusations draw serious attention from the public, the veracity of these allegations remains
contestable since they have not been empirically proven. Noticing that there is already an
abundance of doctrinal analyses discussing what an ideal international adjudication body
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should be like and how the Court should function 205 but only relatively few studies
observing the Court’s actual practices empirically, I aim to assess the performance of the
ICJ judges with statistical methods to supplement the empirical research in this area. In
particular, I aim to assess if the ICJ judges are politically influenced and if the judges form
into voting clusters. In the following sections, I shall lay out the research plan and explain
why I choose statistical analysis as the research method.
(a) Empirical studies in the research of international law
Legal hermeneutics has long been the mainstream of legal studies. Although some
scholars have tried to incorporate empirical analyses into the study of law to make legal
research more scientific and to improve the quality of the work,206 it was not until the past
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two decades that the use of empirical analysis methods has become more common in legal
scholarship. 207 Empirical research has blossomed especially in areas like antitrust
regulations208 and property law.209 Although the overall popularity of empirical research

Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6–10
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in legal scholarship is increasing, its use in the area of international law is still relatively
rare.210
The resistance to using empirical analyses to explore international legal questions may
be due to the sophisticated nature of the subject211 and the practical obstacles such as the
difficulties of acquiring accountable information and data.212 The disaggregation between
studies on international relations and international law213 is also thought to have fueled the
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resistance, since international law scholars focus more on the normative study and are
committed to theorizing “what the law might/should be”214 while IR scholars focus more
on anecdotal and positive observations to explain reality. 215 It was not until this past
decade that the importance of empirical studies on international law has gradually been
recognized and has started to gain greater weight in international legal scholarship.216
(b) Why take an empirical approach in this dissertation?
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Like the studies reviewed in Chapter 2, I also aim to analyze the ICJ judges’ voting
behavior empirically. Considering that the research goal is to identify voting blocs from
the ICJ judges voting records throughout ICJ’s 70 years of history and the need to assess
the large quantity of data, I find statistical analysis to be the appropriate method with the
power to manage and analyze this multitude of data.217 The strengths of statistical analysis
enables this research to identify blocs of judges that consistently share high agreement with
one another and those that vote distinctively. Furthermore, I shall also use regression
analysis to find the variables that correlate with the clustering behaviors among the judges.
1.2 Research Data
The most critical data needed for this research is the ICJ judges’ voting records. In
this dissertation, I coded the judges’ votes over 146 contentious cases and 27 advisory
opinions that the ICJ adjudicated from 1946-2015. 218 Considering that procedural and
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substantive proceedings also substantially affect the rights and obligations of the parties,
the judges’ votes on both jurisdictional and substantive matters are also included.
Nevertheless, since the decisions on provisional measures are only interim and not final,219
there lacks merit to include the judges’ votes on these matters. The judges’ votes on
provisional measures were thus not incorporated in the dataset.
Most of the information used in this dissertation can be acquired and extracted from
public records. The most important data – the ICJ’s advisory decisions and judgments on
contentious cases – are all publicly available on the ICJ’s website.220 In addition to the
vote counts and the decisions, the ICJ website also provides information about the judges’
nationalities and the time they served on the bench. This dissertation also supplemented
other information from Judge Nagendra Singh’s work The Role and Record of the
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International Court of Justice published in 1989221 and the International Court of Justice
Handbook published by the ICJ in 2014.222
(a) Coding methods
Previous studies have applied two different techniques when coding the judge's votes,
which are the claim-based and the case-based coding methods. Depending on the scholars’
preferences and research goals, these two coding methods can help to observe the judges’
voting behaviors either from a microcosmic or macrocosmic perspective.
On average, most ICJ cases include at least three separate issues.223 When the judges
decide a case, instead of casting a single vote over the entire case, judges cast multiple
votes, and each claim is decided separately.224 That said, if a scholar wishes to observe the
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ICJ’s behavior from a macrocosmic perspective, they may want to disregard the separate
claims raised in the proceeding and keep the entire case as a single outcome. In such
circumstances, although the judges may have voted differently over the separate claims,
the judges’ votes would only be coded once for each case. Under this so-called case-based
coding method, the data would be coded based upon the judges’ votes over the issue that
best represents the question that arose out of that case. Alternately, if a scholar aims to
observe the judges’ votes from a microcosmic perspective, a claim-by-claim coding
method (claim-based method) would better match their goal. Under the claim-based coding
method, the judges’ votes on all issues/claims are coded separately and would all be
recorded.
(b) The cons and pros of the case-based and claim-based coding methods
Among the two coding methods, the strengths of the claim-based coding method shine
in circumstances when a case includes multiple critical issues and when a judge supports
different parties on different claims. Using the data compiled with the claims-based coding

international adjudication process. See Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, The Doctrinal Paradox &
International Law, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 67, 79, 115–18, 127 (2012) (primarily using the European Court of
Human Rights as an example, however, the authors note that a similar problem can also appear in the ICJ).
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method allows us to assess the question with the most comprehensive data since all votes
are incorporated. Also, as it is unnecessary for us to select the issue that can best represent
the issue of the case, it is therefore unnecessary for us to compare the importance of the
claims and decide which should be coded and which should be discarded.
Nevertheless, the broad inclusion of all votes also presents some problems since not
every issue brought before the Court shares the same importance. If the research data were
coded on a claim-by-claim basis, and the votes cast on minor issues were not removed or
properly adjusted, the claim-based coding method would have the shortcoming of overrepresenting judges’ decisions on trivial matters and thus would overweight minor matters
in the analysis. Consequently, the judge’s genuine intentions may not be observed.225
The positive feature of the case-based coding method is that it ensures that the judges’
votes on minor claims will not be given the same weight as the critical issues and dilute
the data. Moreover, the data coded by case is also more manageable since its size is only
about one-third of the data coded on claim basis.226 However, the disadvantages of the
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case-based coding method appear when multiple important issues are raised in the same
proceeding. Under the case-based coding method, since the judges’ votes would only be
coded once per case, when the case includes more than one issue, some of the judges’ votes
would thus have to be discarded. Because there lacks an objective guideline on how to
evaluate the importance of each issue and how to select the claim that can best represent
the case, the process of selecting the “most critical issue of each case” may be highly
subjective and even arbitrary. The persuasiveness of the analysis may also thus be
undermined.
In the earlier research, Samore, Suh, and Hensley coded their dataset with the claimbased method; the datasets later used in Weiss, Smith, and Posner and de Figueiredo’s
studies were all coded with the case-based method. Although the scholars provide little
explanation as to why they changed from the earlier claim-based method to the case-based
method, 227 in my speculation, a possible reason for the case-based coding to be more
popular is that datasets coded with such a method are smaller and do not require as much
coding effort.
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(c) The coding method used in this dissertation
The main consideration for coding the ICJ judges’ votes through the claim-based
coding method is that this coding method could strengthen the comprehensiveness of this
project. In the coding spreadsheet, the judges are lumped by their country of origin. The
judges’ votes are coded as in favor of the applicant if the judge agrees or concurs with the
applicant’s argument,228 and are also coded as voting for the applicant if the judge voted
against the counterclaim or defense raised by the respondent. The rest of the votes are coded
as in favor of the respondent. I understand the drawback of using the claim-based coding
method is that the dataset would include votes on claims that share less importance. To
ease the problem of incorporating votes on inessential issues into the dataset and thus
diluting the analysis, I excluded the votes on some minor issues from the analysis. 229
Moreover, due to certain coding constraints and considerations, the judges’ votes were
discarded in the following three circumstances:
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1.3 Types of Votes that are Excluded from the Data
(a) Unidentifiable votes in pre-1978 decisions
After 1978, the ICJ case report provides the majority opinion of the Court and the
concurring and dissenting opinions delivered by judges, the vote tally for each issue, and
the names of judges that voted for and against the decision. 230 These materials are
extremely helpful during the coding process as they provide information about whom the
judges’ have voted for in the decision. However, before 1978, the Court decisions
(including both advisory opinions and contentious cases) only include the overall vote tally
and do not publish the names of the judges that voted for and against the decision.231 This
creates some difficulties in identifying whom the judges voted for in that decision.
In order to code the judges’ votes cast in pre-1978 cases, I read through the judges’
concurring and dissenting opinions and declarations to examine if the judges voted for the
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applicant or the respondent. Nevertheless, the pre-1978 Rule of the Court did not compel
judges to attach an opinion to their votes and the judges could dissent or concur without
providing any reasoning.232 In circumstances when the allocation of the judges’ votes were
not provided in the case report, and the judges did not attach an opinion to their decisions,
the unidentifiable votes were left out of the analysis.233
(b) Votes on territorial (maritime) delimitation issues
In addition to the unidentifiable votes illustrated above, difficulties also arose when I
coded the judges’ votes on territorial and maritime boundary demarcation cases. In
territorial and maritime delimitation disputes, the Court was asked to decide the ownership
of a particular territory or to determine the boundary line between the parties. In the former
scenario, the judges’ votes can be coded by observing whom they ruled the territory
belonged to; but in the boundary demarcation scenario, coding the judges’ votes is
challenging and sometimes unachievable.
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See Article 95(2), ICJ Rules of Court.
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Hensley, Posner and de Figueiredo faced similar problems and they also excluded the votes on these

issues from their data. See Hensley, Bloc Voting, supra note 21, at 43 n.3; Posner & de Figueiredo, supra
note 91, at 611.
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In boundary demarcation cases, the parties would each propose a demarcation line and
persuade the Court to adopt their proposal. However, due to the arbitral nature of territorial
demarcation cases, the Court has discretion over how the boundary line should be drawn
and is not bound by the solutions proposed by the parties. As Brian Sumner observes, the
ICJ often draws the delimitation line in ways that mitigate the interests of both sides but
not in favor of either party.234 Eventually, this became an obstacle for me in coding the
judges’ votes since the decision does not appear to be in favor of either party.235
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Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779,

1806–07 (2004) (“When the court lacks guidance from treaties, uti possidetis, or effective control, it is most
likely to proceed in equity infra legem and halve the difference between the litigants’ positions. The
court … prefers prescribing an equitable solution over entertaining justifications based on geography,
economics, culture, history, elitism, or ideology.”) See also generally NUGZAR DUNDUA, DELIMITATION OF
MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ADJACENT STATES (2007) (observing how equitable resolution was
pursued in various maritime boundary demarcation cases).
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Indeed, it is possible to determine the winner of the case by comparing which party was given a bigger

portion of the disputed territory. Nevertheless, for two reasons, I reject such a proposition. First, it is
difficult to calculate and to compare the size of the delimited territory. Second, to most states, regardless of
the size, losing any portion of territory is intolerable. Thus, it is inadequate to determine the outcome of the
case via comparing the portion of territory given to the parties.
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However, noticing that territorial delimitation disputes are now the most common type
of case referred to the ICJ, 236 it would be a significant deficit to exclude votes on
demarcation cases whenever there is vagueness barring us from identifying the judges’
votes. 237 To remedy the situation and to incorporate as many votes in the dataset as
possible, I ameliorate the coding process using the following methods.
First, as this dissertation aims to observe the proximity between the judges’ voting
patterns and the voting agreements between the judges, what I need to know is if the judges
cast their votes in the same way or differently, rather than whom the judges voted for. Thus,
in territorial demarcation cases, if an unidentifiable claim is decided unanimously, for
coding purposes, the judges’ votes are all coded as voting for the applicant.238 Second, in
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See Table 1 in Chapter 1.
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At the preliminary stage of the analysis, we exclude votes on territorial cases whenever we do not feel

comfortable and confident in identifying which party the judges voted for and thus, a number of claims in
territorial demarcation cases were excluded from the analysis. The author would like to thank the
dissertation committee members for pointing out this problem during the proposal defense and thus for
making this revision possible.
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For the same reason, these votes can also be coded as all voting for the defendant. The coding

preference of voting in favor of the applicant or the respondent does not affect the analysis results. It should
also be noted that the data this dissertation uses to analyze the voting preferences of the national judges has
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non-unanimous cases, if there are judges from the two parties, and these two judges voted
contrarily, I code the judges’ votes that are consistent with the votes of the judge from the
applicant state as voting for the applicant; similarly, the votes that are same as the defendant
judge’s votes are coded as voting for the defendant.
Even with this amelioration, there are still instances where the judges’ votes are
unidentifiable. Most of these happen in situations where the party state judges voted the
same way, but the claim was not decided unanimously. Since I find no adequate way to
adjust and code these votes, the votes on these claims are excluded from our analysis.
(c) Procedural and Administrative Matters
The last type of vote that is not incorporated in the dataset are the judges’ votes on
procedural and managerial issues. As previously mentioned, not all claims brought before
the ICJ share the same importance and some only contain the Court’s political statements
or are decisions on procedural or administrative matters that do not affect the rights and
obligations of the party. The second finding of the Corfu Channel case is a classic example
of this type of decision where the Court rules that it “[r]eserves for further consideration

not be adjusted with this technique since in that particular research, it is critical to know who the judges
actually voted for.
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the assessment of the amount of compensation and regulates the procedure on this subject
by an Order dated this day.”239 A similar example of this can be found in the sixteenth
finding of the Nicaragua case where the Court recalls both parties to “resolve the dispute
in peaceful means in accordance with the international law.”240 In these decisions, the
Court does not determine any substantive matter but merely reiterates the general concept
of international law and illustrates its decision over the procedural arrangement.
As the ICJ’s statements and decisions over administrative and procedural matters do
not affect the rights and obligations of the parties, it is impractical to code the votes on
these decisions as either for the applicant or the respondent. Also, since these issues are
mostly of no importance, excluding the judges’ votes on these matters would also help to
avoid the problem which Posner and de Figueiredo referred to as “overweighing trivial
issues at the expense of important issues.”241 Due to the above considerations, I exclude
the judges’ votes on decisions over pure procedural and administrative matters and the
Court’s general statements from our dataset.

239

Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 39 (April 9th).
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Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment. 1986 I.C.J. 14,

139 (June 27).
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Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 91, at 611.
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2.

Analytical Methods
To assess the ICJ judges’ bloc voting behaviors, most of the previous studies use the

Rice-Beyle bloc analysis method to calculate the index of agreement between the judges
and then approximate the judges’ voting blocs by creating pseudo blocs. 242 However,
instead of using the Rice-Belye method for this dissertation, the proximity between judges’
voting patterns are measured using the “relative distance” calculated through the Euclidean
distance method.243 The reasons and benefits for replacing the Rice-Beyle analysis method
with the Euclidean distance method shall be illustrated as follows:
2.1 The Limits of the Rice-Beyle Analysis Method
In Hensley and Weiss’s studies, they both calculated the voting agreements between
the judges’ votes to examine the similarity between the judges’ thoughts.244 However, the
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Posner and de Figueiredo are the exception. For an explanation of the Rice-Beyle analysis method, see

Hensley, Bloc Voting, supra note 21, at 43–44; Weiss, supra note 22.
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I am indebted to my advisor Professor Ethan Michelson for his enormous help in developing the

research methods and providing programming tools to help calculate the data material.
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Hensley uses the Rice-Beyle analysis method which requires further adjustment after acquiring the

degree of agreement between the judges while Weiss simply uses the degree of agreement to measure the
closeness between the judges’ voting patterns. See Hensley, Bloc Voting, supra note 21; Weiss, supra note
22, at 128–31.
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weakness of this analytical method is that it can only measure the similarity between judges
that have voted together and is thus unable to compare the judges’ voting patterns across
the Court’s history. With the help of the following fictitious example, I shall illustrate the
limited power of the Rice-Beyle method in assessing the voting relationship between the
judges and show why I replaced it with the Euclidean distance method.
Case 1, composed of five issues, is presided over by Judge X and Judge Y. Judge X
votes for the Respondent on all claims while Judge Y votes for the Applicant on claims 1,
2, and 3, and supports the Respondent on claims 4 and 5. If the similarity between Judge
X and Judge Y’s decisions is evaluated through voting agreement, the agreement between
these two judges would be forty since they voted the same way two times out of five, i.e.,
40 percent of the time.245
In the next election, Judge Z is elected and replaces Judge X in the court. In the next
case brought before the court, Case 2, which also consists of five issues, Judge Y votes for
the Applicant on all claims and Judge Z supports the Applicant on the first issue and votes
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If it is preferred to describe the closeness between the two judges by the dissimilarity between them, the

analysis result can also be described as a disagreement between the two judges of 60 (signaling disagreeing
60 percent of the time).
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for the Respondent on all other matters. The distribution of Judges X, Y, and Z’s votes and
the voting agreement matrix between the judges can be presented as Tables 3-1 and 3-2
below:

Table 3-1 Distribution of Judges’ Votes (example)

Case 1

Case 2

Judge X

Judge Y

Judge Z

Claim1

R

A

n/a

Claim 2

R

A

n/a

Claim 3

R

A

n/a

Claim 4

R

R

n/a

Claim 5

R

R

n/a

Claim1

n/a

A

A

Claim 2

n/a

A

R

Claim 3

n/a

A

R

Claim 4

n/a

A

R

Claim 5

n/a

A

R
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Table 3-2 Voting Agreement Matrix (example)
Judge X

Judge Y

Judge Z

Judge X

-

40

n/a

Judge Y

40

-

20

Judge Z

n/a

20

-

Since Judge X and Judge Z never voted together, the closeness between their voting
patterns cannot be assessed through calculating the voting agreements between them.
Consequently, research using voting agreement to measure the proximity between the
judges can only report the voting distance between Judges X and Y, and between Judges
Y and Z. Meanwhile, the voting distance between Judges X and Z will remain unobservable.
As shown in
Table 3-2, the incalculable voting agreement between Judge X and Judge Z becomes
missing cells in the matrix.
The technique of calculating voting agreements between judges demonstrated above
is similar to the Rice-Beyle analysis method used in Hensley’s research and is also akin to
the equation Weiss used to assesses if the judges aligned with the Soviet or the American
judges. As illustrated, the inherent limitation of this analytical method is that it can only
measure the closeness between judges that have voted together before. To avoid having
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missing cells in the analysis matrix, the researcher would either have to reduce the number
of observed subjects or bear with the problem of having missing cells in the matrix. In
Hensley’s case, he chose the former option and reduced the number of judges observed in
his research from 48 to 14.246
If this dissertation also used the Rice-Beyle analysis method to compare the proximity
between the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors across the ICJ’s history, there would be a
significant amount of missing cells in the matrix since a large number of ICJ judges never
had the chance to decide a case together. Consequently, this project will either have to bear
the consequences of having missing cells or limit the observation to smaller groups of
judges that have decided a case together.
Recognizing the limited power of the Rice-Beyle analysis method and that it is
incapable of demonstrating the interactions between all judges,247 this analytical method
does not fit the needs of this dissertation. Hence, instead of comparing the voting cohesion
between each pair of judges through calculating the voting agreements between them, this
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Hensley, Bloc Voting, supra note 21, at 43.

247

See Chapter 3, Section 3(b) for a discussion explaining why Posner & de Figueiredo’s analysis method

does not suffice as bloc voting analysis.
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dissertation describes the closeness between the judges’ voting behavior by the relative
distance (the Euclidean distance) with respect to the votes of the P5 state judges.
2.2 A Better Analytical Method: the Euclidean Distance Method
(a) Measuring the similarity/dissimilarity between the voting patterns by relative distance
Let us turn back to the previous hypothetical cases. Since Judge Y has voted with both
Judge X and Judge Z before, Judge Y can serve as a comparison benchmark when
comparing the similarity and dissimilarity between Judge X and Judge Z’s voting behaviors.
Firstly, while Judges X and Y agree with each other 40 percent of the time and Judge Y
agrees with Judge Z 20 percent of the time, this can also be described as Judge X agrees
with Judge Y 20 percentage points more than Judge Z did with Judge Y. If this observation
is further translated into the notion of distance, the proximity between the judges can also
be described as Judge X voted more closely with Judge Y than Judge Z did by 20
percentage points. In this way, the relative distance measuring method would allow this
dissertation to compare the voting patterns between judges that have never voted together
if an adequate comparison benchmark could be found.
Although the Euclidean distance method is commonly used by social scientists to
examine states’ voting behaviors in the UN General Assembly or even the U.S. Supreme
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Court judges’ voting preferences, no prior study assessing the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors
has deployed this technique before. Consequently, measuring the proximity between the
judges’ voting patterns by relative distance carries novelty.
The closest method used before to evaluate ICJ judges’ voting behavior appears in
Edith Weiss’s research in which she uses the votes of judges from the United States and
the Soviet Union as the benchmark to see if the other judges aligned themselves with judges
from these two superpowers during the Cold War. Nevertheless, since Weiss’s research
only focuses on observing if judges aligned themselves with the two superpowers, it
remains to measure the similarity and dissimilarity between judges’ voting patterns by
calculating the voting agreement between them. The clear difference can be drawn between
analysis methods used in Weiss’s project and those used this dissertation.
In addition, as this dissertation aims to examine if judges from countries that share
political, economic, or cultural similarity are keen to vote closely with each other, the
judges are lumped together by their country of origin. Thus, instead of showing the voting
distance between individual judges, the voting matrix demonstrates the voting distance
between the judges from certain countries.
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(b) Creating the comparison benchmark
In order to compare the voting patterns between judges that have never voted together
through relative distance, we need a third judge or a group of judges that have voted with
all of the observed subjects to serve as the comparison benchmark. Since I aim to observe
the co-voting of all judges across the ICJ’s history, the ideal comparison benchmark for
this dissertation would be a judge or a group of judges that have served on the bench
throughout the Court’s history and have voted with every other ICJ judge. Alternatively,
since the judges are lumped by their country of origin, a country or a group of countries
that constantly have judges serving on the bench would also meet our need. Despite the
fact that no judges have ever served on the bench throughout the ICJ’s history, luckily, the
five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council that constantly have judges serving
on the bench provide the comparison benchmark needed for the analysis.248
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China was the only exception. China did not have a judge on the ICJ bench between 1965 and 1985.

Except for this period, all P5 countries have had a national sitting on the ICJ bench across the Court’s
history. Due to this limit, in the second time period when there were no Chinese judges serving in the court,
the comparison benchmark is comprised of the votes of the judges from the other P4 countries.
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As it is agreed that guaranteeing the powerful countries to have a national serving on
the ICJ bench is a controversial political arrangement,249 the decision to use the votes of
the P5 judges as the comparison benchmark does not imply that this dissertation supports
such an arrangement nor that the votes of the P5 judges carry more importance than the
others. The only reason to use the P5 judges’ votes as the comparison benchmark is that
the consistent appearance of these judges matches the needs of this research. By having the
votes of these five judges’ forming the comparison baseline, it also ensures that the
comparison benchmark could continue to function when a few P5 judges are absent from
the case either because of the judges’ sickness or other reasons.
Although some non-P5 countries like Poland and Japan have also had judges serving
on the bench for extended periods,250 since the mixture of judges from the P5 countries
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KOLB, ELGAR COMPANION, supra note 33, at 105; Ogbodo, supra note 54, at 106–08; Jacob Katz

Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and its
Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 229–30 (2009); Reforming the United Nations: What About the
International Court of Justice?, 5(1) CHINESE J. INT’L L. 39, Part III (2006); Robinson, supra note 50, at
278–80.
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Poland has Judge Bohdan Winiarski serving on the bench from 1946-1967 and Judge Manfred Lachs

from 1967-1993; the three ICJ judges from Japan include: Judge Kotaro Tanaka (1961-1970), Judge
Shigeru Oda (1976-2003), and Judge Hisashi Owada (2003-present).
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already enables the benchmark to include judges from East and West, from developing and
developed countries, and from almost all the main geographical regions, I find no pressing
need to add the Polish and Japanese judges as part of the comparison benchmark. The only
regret here is that I am unable to incorporate an African or Muslin country that consistently
has judges serving in the Court into our comparison parameter.
The first step of the calculation process is to acquire the voting agreement between
the observed judges and the judges from the P5 countries. Following that, this dissertation
uses the Euclidean distance equation to calculate the relative distances between the judges
from the two observed countries. The “Euclidean distance” equation employed is:

,

⋯

=

In the equation, p and q each represent the two countries that the judges are from, and pi
and qi represent the voting distances between the judges from p and q and those from the
P5 countries. For example, p1 and q1 indicates the voting agreement between the observed
judges and the judges from the United States; p2 and q2 indicates the voting agreement
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between the observed judges and the judges from France; similarly, p3~ p5 and q3~q5
represent the voting agreement between the observed judges and the judges from China,
Russia, and the United Kingdom.
Let me illustrate with the examples of India and Pakistan. Although India and Pakistan
both had regular judges serving in the ICJ between 1946 and 1966, the judges from these
two countries never had the chance to hear the same case. Because of that, the proximity
between the voting behaviors of the judges from the two countries cannot be measured
through calculating the voting agreement between them. Nonetheless, with the help of the
Euclidean distance method and the above equation, I am still able to compare the voting
distances between the judges from these two countries through relative distance. Here are
the Indian and Pakistani judges’ levels of agreement with the P5 judges:

India

Pakistan

China

66.67%

90.91%

France
Russia (USSR)

33.33%
66.67%

77.78%
63.63%

United Kingdom

66.67%

66.67%

100%

100%

United States
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Following the above equation, the Euclidean distance between the judges from India
and Pakistan is calculated as the square root of the sum of the squared distance between
the two countries: (587.58+1975.8+9.24+0+0)^1/2 = 50.72.
Of course, this method must be used with caution especially regarding the time
periods that the judges served on the Court, as it may be inadequate to use this method to
compare a judge that served in the Court in the 1940-1950s with a judge that served in the
Court in the 1990s-2000. Accordingly, as illustrated below, this dissertation divides the
data into three time periods.
(c) Hierarchical cluster analysis and regression analysis
In addition to using relative distance to describe the proximity between the judges’
voting patterns, I also use the hierarchical cluster analysis method to visualize the research
findings. 251 In particular, I use ‘Complete Linkage Clustering’ (farthest neighbor
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See generally, RUI XU & DON WUNSCH, CLUSTERING (2009) (see chapter 3 for a discussion of

hierarchical cluster analysis); William Revelle, Hierarchical Cluster Analysis and the Internal Structure of
Tests, 14 MULTIVARIATE BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 57 (1979).
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clustering 252 ) to visualize the clusters in dendrograms so that the voting blocs formed
among the judges can be better observed. Lastly, using the matrices acquired through
calculating the Euclidean distance between the judges’ voting agreements, I further assess
the possible variables contributing to the formation of the voting blocs in the Court through
regression analysis.
(d) Dividing the timeline into three periods
In the literature review section, I have stressed that time and history are the two critical
factors that should be taken into consideration when assessing the judges’ voting behaviors.
Accordingly, for purposes of analysis, I divide the Court’s history into three periods and
shall assess the judges’ voting behaviors in each time-period separately. The three divided
timelines are (1) 1946–1966, (2) 1967–1984, and (3) 1985–2015. In addition to the benefit
of allowing us to observe how the judges’ voting behaviors changed through time, there
are three additional reasons to divide the analysis into the three suggested time periods:
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For equations and introduction of the difference between different Agglomerative hierarchical

clustering, see XU & WUNSCH, supra note 251, at 32–37; BRIAN S. EVERITT, SABINE LANDAU & MORVEN
LEESE, CLUSTER ANALYSIS 57–67 (4th edn. 2001).
115

First, the first two periods combined (1946–1984) roughly correspond to the phase of
the Cold War, and the third period represents a post-Cold War era. Hence, by comparing
the judges voting patterns in the first two and the third period, we are able to observe if and
how the change in the judges’ voting behaviors correspond to the end of Cold War.
Moreover, by dividing 1946–1984 into two periods, we are able to observe if and how the
change in the judges’ voting behaviors correspond to the exacerbating Cold War between
the East and the West.
Second, while the ratio of judges from Asia and Africa has increased between 1965
and 1970, dividing the Cold War phase into two periods allows us to observe how the
changes in the Court’s composition affects the formation of voting clusters in the Court.
Dividing 1946–1984 into two periods also enables this research to examine how the preexisting voting bloc(s) respond to such changes.
Third, the division of time periods is also a result of the practical concern that the
Chinese judges are absent from the Court between 1967 and 1984. After Judge Wellington
Koo, nominated by the Nationalist China, retired from the Court in 1967, due to the
representation problem between the Communist and Nationalist China, no Chinese judge
was elected between 1967 and 1984. Consequently, when calculating the voting distances
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between the judges with the above-mentioned Euclidean distance, the votes of Chinese
judges were only incorporated in the first and third periods (1946–1966 and 1985–2015).
In the second period (1967–1984), the comparison benchmark is only comprised of the
votes of judges from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union
(Russia).
(e) Dividing the analysis by types of disputes
In addition to observing the judges’ voting patterns from an overall perspective, I am
also interested in assessing the voting clusters that only appear in certain kinds of disputes.
Hence, in this dissertation, I shall conduct separate cluster and regression analyses based
upon the categorization presented in Chapter 1 and shall compare and identify the
differences between the voting clusters identified in different clusters. Moreover, I shall
examine if the judges show unique voting patterns when adjudicating specific types of
cases.

3. Expected Contribution and Research Limits
This dissertation aims to add to the literature in four ways. The first contribution is to
establish an empirical analysis of ICJ judges’ voting behaviors across the Court’s history.
By this, I aim to clarify the previous studies’ contradicting conclusions regarding if voting
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blocs exist in the ICJ. As a side project, I shall also keep track of national judges’
preferences in supporting their home countries and appointers.
Second, with the help of the relative distance measuring method, this dissertation
hopes to document and compare the voting agreements between all judges. As no prior
studies have provided any analysis like this, I hope the introduction of this new analysis
method will strengthen the studies of the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors and reveal new
findings.
Third, with the help of regression analysis, this dissertation aims to examine the longspeculated question of whether judges from countries sharing a similarity in political
ideological, economic development, and other social connections form into voting blocs.
In this part, the analysis shall particularly address if the judges’ voting patterns correspond
with the interests or the political or social alignment and connections between the judges’
home countries. I shall also compare the clusters identified in this study with those
identified in the analysis of the UN General Assembly’s voting records.
Fourth and last, for practical implications, I hope that this comprehensive analysis of
the judges’ voting behaviors will help the IR and IL scholars to understand the actual
performance of the ICJ better. Based on the findings, perhaps scholars may replenish the
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broader study on how external factors may influence judges’ behaviors and develop
theories explaining the relationship between the judges serving in international tribunals
and their home countries.253 From a more practical perspective, I hope that the findings of
this dissertation can assist states in having a better understanding of the ICJ’s actual
performance and may help them to determine if the ICJ is their ideal dispute settlement
forum.
A comparison of this dissertation project and previous studies regarding research
inquiry, research methodology, comprehensiveness, and the dataset used for analysis is
provided in Table 3-3 on page 121.

253

Recent studies propose that new institutional arrangements in courts like the European Court of Justice

and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body may better secure the international court’s independence and
impartiality than traditional courts like the ICJ. See Born, supra note 103, 758–59 (arguing that the second
generation of international courts (e.g. the WTO DSB, arbitral tribunals under investment treaties), with
relatively dependent adjudicators and more enforceable decisions, are more effective than the first
generation courts (e.g. ICJ, ITLOS)); Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 458-59 (2000) (suggesting
“low independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of interstate dispute resolution and high
independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of transnational dispute resolution.”)
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Lastly, before moving to the chapters reporting the results of this study, I would like
to provide the disclaimer that this dissertation does not attempt to report or find the
mechanism(s) influencing the judges’ voting behaviors. Although I shall later report on
and demonstrate some of the ICJ judges’ partial and biased voting behaviors through
cluster and regression analysis, the analytical methods used in this dissertation are
incapable of identifying the mechanism(s) causing such behaviors. Hence, when reading
the analysis results, one should bear in mind that this research only reports the phenomenon
of bias and partiality but not the cause of such phenomenon.

120

121

122

The Voting Preferences of National Judges

Chapters 4 and 5 report the major findings of this dissertation. Chapter 4 starts with
reporting the average proportion of votes that the prevailing party receives in cases, with
the purpose to examine if ICJ decisions are mostly made with a high degree of unanimity
or with a divided bench. The second part of Chapter 4 reports on the party state judges’
voting preferences and examines if national judges continue to show distinctive voting
patterns and remain keen to vote in favor of the appointers.

1.

Are ICJ Decisions Generally Made with a High Degree of Unanimity?
In comparison with other political decision-making bodies, scholars have reported

that judicial decisions are generally made facing less disagreement from within the
bench.254 A high degree of unanimity is said to be one of the unique features that judicial
decision-making carries.255 Hence, in the first step of analysis, I aim to observe if a high
degree of unanimity can also be found in ICJ’s decision-making or if the Court faces a high
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Peter Willetts, Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 569, 576 (1972).
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volume of disagreements, similar to institutions such as the UN General Assembly or the
US Congress.
As shown in Table 4-1, this dissertation reports that most of the ICJ decisions were
decided with the prevailing party receiving a high proportion of support from the bench.256
Among the 346 claims observed, 62 percent of the claims were decided unanimously or
with no more than one judge dissenting. Cumulatively, more than 83 percent of the claims
were decided with fewer than four judges dissenting.257 Since on average the decisions
made under the contentious proceedings were supported by 89% of the bench (meaning
with less than two judge dissenting), the analysis shows that the typical feature of judicial
decision-making is reflected in the ICJ’s voting records.
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See supra note 254. It should be noted that the votes of judges from party states (including both regular

and ad hoc judges) are excluded due to the fact that party state judges are known to be keen to vote in favor
of their own country or their appointer. While their distinctive voting preference has already been
identified, we tend to preclude them in this part so that the voting behavior of other non-party state judges
can be better observed. This exclusion was out of the consideration that party state judges were already
known to be keen to vote for their own country. The inclusion of party state judges would likely result in at
least one dissenter in each case.
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This roughly correspond to 80~85% of judges supporting the prevailing party.
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Table 4-1 Level of Support for the Prevailing Party in Contentious Case Claims
Percentage of
judges supporting

50-59%

60-69%

70-74%

75-79%

80-84%

85-89%

90-100%

2%

9%

5%

7%

9%

5%

62%

(N=6)

(N=31)

(N=18)

(N=24)

(N=31)

(N=19)

(N=216)

the prevailing party

Percentage of
claims decided
under this rate of
support

Average percentage
of votes the

89%

prevailing party
receives

As presented in Table 4-2, if we further divide the analysis by type of dispute, a high
degree of unanimity is still reported in most of the observations across all subcategories of
cases. Among all the subcategories, the cases that report high disagreement are those
relating to trusteeship (decolonization) issues, and most of the dissents found therein are
sourced from the South West Africa case. 258 Because the South West Africa case was
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Including both South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa) and South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South

Africa). The other trusteeship case brought under the contentious proceeding is the East Timor case
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known for reflecting the legal and political conflict between the colonial power and the
formerly colonized countries, this increases the possibility for judges to take the political
viewpoints of their home countries into consideration and also the likelihood for
disagreement to occur. But besides Trusteeship cases, we find no significant and constant
disagreements between the judges. In short, the finding that no systematic disagreements
are found between the ICJ judges refute the hypothesis that the radical confrontations found
between countries in political realms is also replicated in the ICJ.

Table 4-2 Average Percentage of Judges Who Voted for the Prevailing Party in Contentious
Proceedings (disaggregated by case type)

Case Type

Aerial
Incident

Territorial/
Maritime
Demarcation

Property
Rights

Trusteeship Use of Force

Diplomatic
Relationship

Other

Average percentage of
votes the prevailing

83%

89%

90%

62%

91%

92%

88%

party receives

between Portugal and Australia. However, the East Timor decision was averagely supported by 93 percent
of the bench.
126

We turn now to the analysis of advisory opinion proceedings. As shown in Table 4-3,
most of the ICJ advisory opinions are also decided with high unanimity and with few
dissents. Almost half of the decisions were decided with the unanimous support of the
bench. Although the average rate of support that the prevailing party received in advisory
opinion proceedings was about 5% lower than those reported in the contentious
proceedings, on average advisory opinion decisions were still supported by 84 percent of
the bench (meaning that there were about less than two out of fifteen judges dissenting).259

Table 4-3 Level of Support for the Majority Opinion in Advisory Opinion Claims
Percentage of votes
in the majority
Percentage of claims
decided under this
supporting rate

50-59%

60-69%

70-74%

75-79%

80-84%

85-89% 90-100%

6%

14%

6%

13%

4%

12%

45%

(N=5)

(N=11)

(N=5)

(N=10)

(N=3)

(N=9)

(N=35)

Average percentage
of supporting votes in

84%

the majority
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Ideally, the bench would be composed of 15 judges. However, due to sickness or the inclusion of ad hoc

judges, not all cases were decided with 15 judges on the bench. The actual number of judges on the bench
varies and ranged from 11~17.
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2.

The National Judges’ Voting Preferences
Let us now turn to observe the voting preferences of the judges from or appointed by

the party states. Previous scholarship consistently reports that these judges show obvious
keenness to vote in favor of those who appoint them. First, however, I would like to clarify
the definitions of a few terms that are used in this section before introducing the analysis
method and interpreting the findings.
In this dissertation, ‘regular judges’ refers to judges that are nominated by a state and
elected to the ICJ through the ordinary ICJ judge election procedures. If the regular judges’
home countries become disputing parties before the ICJ during their term of service, the
regular judges from these disputing parties are referred to as ‘regular judges from party
states.’ On the other hand, ‘ad hoc judges’ refers to the judge(s) that are appointed by party
states to join the decision-making of a particular case when the party state does not already
have a national serving on the ICJ bench. The ad hoc judges may be a national of the party
state but may also be from any other country. Lastly, the term ‘national judges’ refers to
judges that are either nominated or appointed by the party states, hence, this term covers
both ‘regular judges from party states’ and also ‘ad hoc judges’ regardless of their national
origin.
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As early as 1933, through observing the voting patterns of judges serving in the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Hersch Lauterpacht first argued that the
judges serving in international adjudication institutions may be consciously or
subconsciously biased in favor of their own countries.260 H. Lauterpacht argues that even
with all the institutional steps taken to avoid the ad hoc judges acting in the interest of their
states, the judges’ preference to vote in favor of their home countries/appointors is almost
impossible to eliminate.261 The separate studies of Samore, Hensley, and Smith have also
reported that national judges are keen to vote in favor of their home countries and
appointers. In this section, the research goals are also to assess the national judges’
preferences for voting in favor of their home country or appointer and to provide updated
information about the national judges’ voting preferences.
Unsurprisingly, the conclusion reached in this dissertation over the ICJ national
judges’ voting preferences is not different from the aforementioned studies. In my study, I
also find that the national judges either nominated or appointed by the party states continue
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LAUTERPACHT, supra note 107, at 233–36.
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Id.
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to showed consistent preference for voting in favor of their home country or nominator
across the ICJ’s history.
2.1 The National Judges’ Strong Tendency to Support Their Home Countries or
Appointers
The analysis starts with examining the national judges’ tendency to vote in favor of
their home countries or appointers. Table 4-5 shows that throughout the ICJ’s history,
national judges that are either nominated or appointed by party states voted for their home
countries and appointers around 80 percent of the time. The tendency for regular judges
from party states to vote in favor of their home countries is identical to the support ad hoc
judges show to their appointers. With the support of this evidence, I disagree with Smith’s
earlier observation and argument that regular judges carry a “modicum of independence”
and act more independently than the ad hoc judges.
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Nothing in the evidence at hand

suggests that regular judges show less support to their home country in comparison with
ad hoc judges’ preferences to vote in favor of their appointers.
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Smith, supra note 83, at 218. Suh and Hensley also advance similar arguments, see Hensley, National

Bias, supra note 17, at 577; Suh, supra note 18, at 230.
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Table 4-4 Percentage of National Judges Voting for Their Country or Appointer
Regular Judges from Party States

Year
Percentage of votes

Ad hoc Judges

1945-1966

1967-1984

1985-2015

1945-1966

1967-1984

1985-2015

79.3

93.3

73

83.6

85.8

77.8

supporting their
home country/
appointor

78.8

79.7

Although Table 4-4 reports that the national judges, including both regular judges
from party states and ad hoc judges, hold a strong tendency to support their home countries
or appointors, this data does not illustrate whether and how the national judges act
distinctively from the rest of the bench. In order to assess if national judges show greater
tendency to vote in favor of their home countries and appointers, I compare the national
judges’ votes with those of the other judges that are not from the party states.
As Table 4-5 presents, national judges voted in favor of their home countries and
appointers significantly more than the judges from non-party states. On average, national
judges voted for their appointers 30 percentage points more than the average percentage of
non-party state judges who voted for that country. Also, regardless of if the national judges
were appointed by the applicant or by the respondent, or if they were regular or ad hoc
131

judges, they all voted in favor of their appointors significantly more than the other judges
throughout the Court’s history.

Table 4-5 Rate at which National Judges Voted More for their Appointer or Nominator
Compared with Other Members of the ICJ
% Point Difference Between Non-Party State Judges and …
Regular Judges

Regular Judges

Ad hoc Judges

Ad hoc Judges

from the Applicant

from the

Appointed by

Appointed by

States

Respondent States

Applicant States

Respondent States

1946-1964

31.7

22.7

37.2

40.5

1965-1984

22.9

53.6

40.7

0263

1985-2015

41.6

20.7

32.2

29.7

Overall

31.5

28.5

34

31.9

It is worth noticing that the average percentage deviation between the voting rates of
national judges and other members from non-party states reported in this dissertation is
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There is only one case in this time period that was adjudicated with the participation of an ad hoc judge,

and in that case, the ad hoc judge agreed 100% with the other judges.
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about 8 percentage points higher than what Hensley reported in his 1968 study.264 In other
words, between 1968 (the year Hensley’s study was completed) and 2015, the national
judges must have supported their home countries and appointers at a even greater degree
than they had previously so that the overall average deviation increased.
Meanwhile, from the fact that the national judges consistently voted for their
appointers and nominators 80 percent of the time and 30 percentage points more than the
other judges, their tendency to vote in favor of their appointers and nominators is
apparent.265 Nonetheless, as national judges from the applicant and respondent states both
show similar tendencies to support their appointers and nominators, the votes of these
national judges are likely to cancel each other out. I thus share with Suh, Samore, Posner
and de Figueiredo the observation and opinion that the national judges’ votes are unlikely
to influence the outcome of the case.266
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The average deviation rate reported in this research is 30 percentage points while Hensley reports an

average 22 percentage point deviation. See Hensley, National Bias, supra note 17, at 572.
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Some consider this as hard evidence proving that the national judges are biased. See id.
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Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 91, at 609; Suh, supra note 18, at 233–34; Samore, supra note 54,

at 210–11.
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2.2 Do the Parties Prefer to Appoint Their Citizens as ad hoc Judges?
Although nationality was long considered the major reason for ad hoc judges to be
keen to vote in favor of their appointers,267 I disagree with this proposition. Instead, my
analysis shows not only that the party states do not have a strong preference in appointing
their citizens, but neither was ‘citizenship’ the leading cause driving the ad hoc judges to
vote for their home country.
Firstly, of the 139 total instances where ad hoc judges took part in the adjudication,
in only 70 were the ad hoc judges selected from the party states’ own citizens. As nearly
half of the ad hoc judges were unrelated to the party state (at least not in the sense of
nationality connection), this rejects the argument that parties are keen to select their own
citizens as ad hoc judges.268 In some more rare circumstances, states are even willing to
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Smith, supra note 83, at 222, ‘nationality… was a prime aspect of individual definition.’ See also

OLIVER J. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 49–50 (Lawbook Exchange, 2006) (1951).
268

For example, in the case of Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 between

Honduras and Nicaragua, Honduras appointed Roberto Ago from Italy as ad hoc judge; in the case of
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean between Bolivia and Chile, Chile appointed Louise
Arbour from Canada as its choice of ad hoc judge. For more examples, see All Judges ad hoc, International
Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/all-judges-ad-hoc (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
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appoint their counter-party’s nationals as ad hoc judge. One classic example is the case
concerning Certain Criminal Proceedings in France between the Republic of Congo and
France.269 The plaintiff, the Republic of Congo, had the right to appoint an ad hoc judge
since it had no national serving on the bench, but instead of appointing its own citizen or
someone from its region, Congo appointed a national of its counterparty, Jean-Yves de
Cara from France, as its ad hoc judge. If the nationality linkage was truly the cardinal
criteria to be considered when the state selects its ad hoc judge, it is hardly imaginable that
Congo would choose a French national as its ad hoc judge. Moreover, as ad hoc Judge
Cara supported Congo as the lone dissenter in all decisions in that case, Cara’s French
nationality does not seem to have prevented him from voting in favor of Congo and against
his own country.
In order to further rebut the assertion that nationality was the primary reason causing
ad hoc judges to vote for their appointer, I compared the voting preferences between ad
hoc judges with and without citizenship from one of the party states. In my hypothesis, if
a nationality linkage between the judges and their home countries is the primary reason
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Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Rep. Congo v. Fran.), Order, 2003 I.C.J. 102 (June 17).
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causing ad hoc judges to be keen to vote in favor of their appointers, the ad hoc judges
with the same nationality as one of the party states should show an even stronger tendency
to vote in favor of their appointers than those without such a connection.
Table 4-6 presents the results of the disaggregated analysis of the voting preferences
of the ad hoc judges with and without a party state’s nationality. Across the Court’s history,
ad hoc judges selected from party and from non-party states both identically supported
their appointers at a rate of 80 percent. There lacks an indication that ad hoc judges with a
party state’s nationality show greater support to their appointers than ad hoc judges selected
from non-party states. In other words, the influence of nationality may have long been
exaggerated and overlooked.

Table 4-6 Rate at which ad hoc Judges from the Party States and Those from Third
Parties Voted in Favor of Their Appointers

Year

%

of

judges

Ad hoc Judges with Party State

ad hoc Judges without Party State

Nationality

Nationality

1945-1966

1967-1984

1985-2015

1945-1966

1967-1984

1985-2015

73.3

100

81.5

93

75

80.3

voting for their
appointor

81

80.3
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2.3 Are National Judges Showing Less Support to Their Home Countries and
Appointers?
In Smith’s 2005 study, he argues that national judges are gradually showing less
support to their appointers and are acting with greater independence.270 However, in this
dissertation, through observing the moving average (by 5 cases) and linear prediction over
the degree that the votes of national judges deviate from the other judges, I find no evidence
supporting the argument that the difference between the national judges’ and other judges’
voting patterns is diminishing. In Figures 4-1 to 4-4, I present the difference between the
rate of support given to the parties by the national judges and by the other judges, and use
the moving average and linear prediction to report the short-term and long-term deviation
trend.
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See Smith, supra note 83, at 219, 222.
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Figure 4-1 Percent difference in rate of regular judges from applicant
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Figure 4-2 Percent difference in rate of ad hoc judges from applicant
states supporting their appointers versus other judges
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Moving Average (by 5 cases)

Figure 4-3 Percent difference in rate of regular judges from
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Figure 4-4 Percent difference in rate of ad hoc judges from
respondent states supporting their appointers versus other judges
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Moving Average (by 5 cases)

In Figures 4-2 and 4-3, the linear predictions of the degree to which national judges
from the party states support their nominators or appointors more than the other judges are
basically a flat horizon. This indicates that there has been little change in the keenness of
ad hoc judges appointed by applicant states and regular judges from respondent states to
vote in favor of their nominators or appointors throughout the Court’s history. The linear
prediction in Figure 4-1 shows a positive slope, while the linear prediction in Figure 4-4
reports a negative slope. Based on the evidence at hand, it is too crude to make any
argument regarding whether national judges are gradually showing greater independence
and are showing less support to their appointers.
However, echoing Judges Rosalyn Higgins and Michael Schwebel’s rebuttal of the
accusation that national judges are biased and keen to vote for their appointers,271 there
are indeed a few instances where the national judges voted identically to the other judges
and showed no particular preference in supporting their nominator. Once in a while,
national judges would even vote against their home country more than the other judges did
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Heiner Schulz & Rosalyn Higgins, The Political Foundations of Decision Making by the European

Court of Justice, 99 ASIL PROCEEDING ANNUAL MEETING 132, 137–38 (2005); Schwebel, supra note 18,
at 893 (arguing that there is still quite a number of national judges that take positions that are not congruent
with those of their countries.).
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(see the negative deviation in the case decided in 1952 in Figure 4-1, and the cases decided
in 2004 and 2009 in Figure 4-3). Nevertheless, from an overall perspective, I am unable to
concur with Smith’s argument stating that judges are acting with greater independence and
showing less support to their appointors and home countries. There lacks sufficient
evidence to support such a proposition.
3. Conclusion
In this chapter, I reached three conclusions. Firstly, I have reported that the vast
majority of the ICJ cases were decided with a high degree of unanimity and few dissents
from the judges. The analysis results provide no evidence that the ICJ has become an arena
for states to advance their political goals and denounce their political rivals.
In addition, through comparing the voting behaviors of the judges from or appointed
by party states with the rest of the bench, the second part of this chapter reaffirms that both
regular and ad hoc judges nominated and appointed by the parties continue to show great
support to their home countries and appointors, voting for them an average of 80 percent
of the time. On the one hand, this dissertation reports that the parties do not show a
particular preference in selecting their own citizens as ad hoc judges; on the other hand,
the keenness of ad hoc judges selected from a third country to vote in favor of their
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appointors is identical to that of judges that are nationals of the party state. All ad hoc
judges show a great degree of support for their appointor regardless of whether there is a
nationality linkage between them. Lastly, I report that there is no evidence showing that
national judges are gradually acting more independently and showing less support to their
appointors.
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Voting Blocs in the ICJ

In Chapter 2, I have indicated that the previous studies’ findings regarding the existence
of voting blocs within the ICJ are split and inconclusive. While some report that judges
from the Soviet States and the NATO States emerge into separate voting blocs, others argue
that the allegations of the existence of voting blocs are false and groundless. In this chapter,
with the help of the Euclidean distance analysis method, I aim to examine and report on
the blocs that emerge in the ICJ and identify the features of these blocs. In addition, the
analyses in this chapter shall further divide the timeframe into smaller fragments and
disaggregate the cases by the type of dispute. In this way, I hope to observe the voting blocs
that emerge in different periods and when the Court hears different types of cases and to
assess the differences between them.
The research methods are already explained in detail in Chapter 3, and will not be
repeated in this chapter. After making a few notes to refresh memories about the data and
the analytical methods, I shall move directly to discussing the analysis results. This chapter
is comprised of two sections. The first reports on and assesses the voting blocs identified
through the cluster analyses, and the second observes the variables that correlate with the
formation of the clusters.
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1. Bloc Voting Analysis
1.1 Data
The data used to assess the ICJ judges’ bloc voting behaviors include the judges’ votes
over a total of 146 contentious cases and 27 advisory opinions decided between 1946 and
2015.272 With some exceptions,273 the dataset is coded on a claim-basis and incorporates
judges’ votes on almost all claims decided by the Court. In the coding process, information
about the judges’ nationality, the disputing parties, the participating ad hoc judges, and the
parties that the judges voted for in each claim are all documented. Other information such
as the type of dispute and the year that the case was decided were also collected.
1.2 Analysis Processes
The transformation of the ICJ’s voting record into observable voting clusters is done
through a three-step process. The first step is to calculate the rate of voting agreements
between the judges and the P5 state judges.274 As I have already illustrated in Chapter 4,
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The actual number of cases coded is 122 since some cases were discontinued at the request of the

parties or dismissed for other reasons.
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Discussion of the coding methods and circumstances under which certain claims are excluded from our

analysis are illustrated in Chapter 2, Sections 1.2 and 1.3.
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In this research, all judges are lumped together and identified by the countries that they are from.
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the judges from and appointed by party states show unique voting patterns and are keen to
support their home countries and appointers. Therefore, the national judges’ votes are
excluded from the analysis to avoid the dataset being influenced by their unique votes.275
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The inclusion of national judges' votes in the dataset has two major drawbacks. Firstly, including the

votes of national judges would greatly increase the number of judges observed since the votes of all ad hoc
judges additionally selected would also be included. However, as most of the ad hoc judges only appear in
the court once, including them in the analysis would diluted our observations of the voting behaviors of the
regular judges. Moreover, as the national judges are already known to be keen to vote for their home
country and appointer, the inclusion of these votes may also have a negative impact on the observation of
the other judges’ clustering behavior. In this dissertation, I have run the analyses with datasets both
including and excluding the votes of national judges. But just as I have speculated, in the analysis using the
dataset that includes the national judges’ votes, many significant findings that can be observed when using
the dataset without the votes of national judges disappear. For instance, when conducting the analysis with
the dataset excluding the votes of national judges, the analysis reports that the judges from countries with
NATO membership voted closely with each other at a significant level. However, if the same analysis is
done using the dataset that includes the votes of national judges, the significance of the NATO match
disappears. When I look into the cases for a possible explanation of this difference, it seems that this
difference stems from the fact that a number of ad hoc judges were selected from the NATO States and
they voted very differently from the other NATO permanent judges that serve in the Court. In addition to
reducing the significance of the NATO matches, the significance of the many other findings is also
affected. As I believe that the analysis using the data without the votes of national judges best demonstrates
the significance and contribution of our findings, the analyses of this chapter were all done using the
dataset that excludes the votes of national judges. Nonetheless, as the P5 countries were sometimes the
party states, a drawback of using the dataset excluding the votes of national judges is that this reduces the
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In the second step, the voting agreements between the judges and the P5 state judges
were transformed and described as the relative voting distance using the Euclidean distance
method introduced in Chapter 3, and I use hierarchical cluster analysis to visualize the
clusters and observe the emergence of voting blocs in the Court. The results of the cluster
analysis shall be presented in dendrograms.
The transformation of actual voting agreements into relative distance does not distort
the data. The scatterplots in Figure 5-1 show that after the conversion, the relative voting
distance still highly correlates with the actual voting agreements between the judges. In
other words, the fact that high voting agreements between judges are now presented as
close voting distances between the judges’ voting patterns indicates that the data has not
been distorted in the transformation process. Negative correlations between the actual
voting agreements and the relative voting distances were reported in both analyses of the
Contentious Cases and Advisory Opinions.

number of countries serving as comparison benchmark (this mostly occurs when I assess cases involving a
specific type of dispute in the disaggregated time-period.) But for the sake of best demonstrating the
significance and contribution of our findings, I stay with the decision to assess the research question with
the dataset that excludes the votes of national judges.
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Figure 5-1 Scatterplots Depicting Degree of Consistency between L2 (Relative Voting
Distance) and Actual Voting Agreement
A. Combined Cases

B. Contentious Cases

C. Advisory Opinions

In the third step, I conducted a regression of the relative voting distances between the
judges with the purpose of testing the variables that correlate with the clustering behavior
of the ICJ judges. Just as Alker and Russult have shown in their classic study of voting
groups in the UN General Assembly that different voting clusters emerge when the
organization deals with various subject issues,276 I am also interested in learning if topicspecific clusters arise in the ICJ and if different clusters emerge in different time-periods.
Hence, I disaggregated the data and observed the cohesion formed among judges in
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HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR. & BRUCE M. RUSSET, WORLD POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 193–200

(1965), the three major issue dimensions or “super-issues” identified have been characterized as “Cold
War,” “colonial self-determination,” and “supranationalism” issues.
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different time periods and when the Court adjudicates over different types of cases. The
subsets of analyses assessed include (1) an analysis of all contentious cases, (2) an analysis
of all advisory opinions, and (3) analyses of the six types of disputes brought under the
contentious proceedings.277 In addition, time was also added as a parameter, and all of the
analyses mentioned above were assessed with the ICJ’s history divided into three periods.
In total, the analyses produced 36 dendrogram graphs showing the voting clusters
formed under different parameter settings. As I do not wish to overwhelm the readers with
dozens of charts and figures, only the graphs that carry noticeable features will be presented
and discussed. The entire collection of dendrogram graphs is provided in the Appendix for
the reader’s reference.278
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In Chapter 1, the cases were divided into seven categories. However, as the last category “other” is

composed of cases not belonging to the six other categories and does not carries its own features, we do not
conduct a cluster analysis of cases under this category.
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It should be noted that when the analyses were broken down into specific time periods and types of

cases, the number of cases that fall within the scope of analysis also decreased. In some disaggregated
analyses, there may be only one case (or even none) that satisfies the condition set forth in the designated
category.
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2. The Voting Blocs in the ICJ
2.1 Overall Observation: A Soviet Bloc in Advisory Opinion Proceedings
In studies of UN General Assembly voting behavior, Hovet, Alker and Russett, and
Holloway have pointed out that the Soviet (Warsaw Pact) bloc was the most cohesive bloc
in the UN. 279 However, looking through the dendrograms reflecting the emergence of
blocs within the ICJ, I only find a Soviet bloc noticeable in the advisory opinions
proceedings between 1946 and 2015. As shown in Figure 5-2, the judges from the three
Communist States – namely the Soviet Union (marked as Russia), Poland, and Yugoslavia
– formed into a compact cluster (the clusters are preliminarily separated with the black
dotted line), and have voted quite distantly from most of the judges from NATO countries.
Although the analyses only report and identify one voting cluster formed by the judges
from the (former) Soviet States, this finding nevertheless challenges the conclusion reached
by some scholars that denies the existence of Soviet and NATO blocs in the ICJ.280 In
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Weiss, supra note 22, at 130.
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addition, the finding here that reports the Polish judges vote closely with the other
Communist state judges in advisory proceedings also challenges the traditional observation
that the Polish judges vote distinctly from the other Communist judges.281
Exciting as it may be to identify a Communist bloc in the ICJ, the significance of this
finding should not be overstated. The influence of the Soviet bloc is inherently limited by
its size. As the Communist bloc only consists of three judges (the number of judges that
Eastern European states were given during the earlier periods of ICJ), the actual influence
and power of this Communist bloc in the ICJ should not be overemphasized since this
group is unlikely to be impactful enough to alter the outcome of cases without the help of
others. Just as the Soviet States were often doomed as a political minority in voting
situations in the United Nations,282 the Communist bloc also only shares limited influence
in the ICJ.
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Weiss argues that the Soviet judge and the Polish judge do not vote together much more frequently than

the U.S. and Polish judge. See id. at 131. However, in some later periods of the ICJ, the Polish judge does
vote distantly from the Soviet judges.
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Figure 5-2 Cluster Analysis of Advisory Opinions (1946–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Aside from the identification of a Communist bloc in the advisory opinion
proceedings, our analysis across the Court’s history only acquired limited information
about the existence of meaningful clusters. Looking through the dendrograms that report
the judges’ clustering behavior in contentious cases, I find no clear indication that the
judges from the same geographical region, with the same cultural background, or from
countries that adhere to similar political ideology form into clusters. Most of the clusters
identified consist of judges from countries with various differences and do not match with
any pre-existing caucusing voting groups. Up to this point, as Weiss and McWhinney have
argued,283 there seems to be little evidence suggesting that political ideology or regional
alignment have a significant influence on the ICJ judges’ decision-making and voting
patterns.
2.2 Disaggregated Analysis: The Voting Blocs that Emerge in Different Periods of
History
While the analysis of all cases across the Court’s history only reports one obvious
voting bloc (at least in my perspective), I further disaggregate the analysis by breaking
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down the timeline into shorter time-periods to see if other voting blocs emerge and if the
already identified Communist bloc remains detectable in all subsets of cases. Here, the
ICJ’s history is divided into three periods. The first time-period covers cases from 1946 to
1966, the second time-period covers cases from 1967 to 1984, and the third time-period
covers cases from 1985 to 2015.
(a) The Communist bloc in the Court
The Soviet bloc continues to remain noticeable in the disaggregated analyses. The
three instances where the Soviet bloc is identified include: (1) advisory opinion
proceedings between 1946 and 1966, (2) advisory opinion proceedings between 1985 and
2015, and (3) contentious case proceedings between 1985 and 2015. The dendrograms that
show these analysis results are provided as Figures 5-3 to 5-5.
In the first period, the Communist bloc only appears in the advisory opinion
proceedings and not in the analysis of contentious cases. However, the Communist bloc
soon disappears in the second period in both sets of analyses as the number of seats
distributed to the Eastern European states is reduced to accommodate more judges from
the African and Asian regions and as the Polish judges start to vote differently than those
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from the U.S.S.R. The Communist bloc does not revive and become noticeable again until
the third period, after China (PRC) joins the group.
The finding showing the Chinese judges joining the Communist bloc in the third
period is worth noticing. In the first time-period, the Chinese ICJ judges nominated by the
Nationalist regime (the Republic of China currently located in Taiwan) voted closely with
the judges from the NATO countries and remained distant from the Communist judges
(infra Figure 5-3 is an example). 284 In the third period, however, the Chinese judges
nominated by the Communist regime (the Peoples’ Republic of China) became close
companions with the judges from Russia (infra Figure 5-5 is an example). The cohesion
between the Russian and Chinese judges also shares great similarity with the two countries’
cooperation in the United Nations and other international organizations.285

284

G. Terry reports that Judge Hsu Mo voted closely with the judges from the U.K., Belgium, the U.S.,

France, Norway, and El Salvador (mostly NATO countries).
285

Peter Ferdinand, Rising powers at the UN: an analysis of the voting behaviour of brics in the General

Assembly, 35(3) THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 376, 382 (2014) (see especially Table 3 for the index
agreement between Russia and China in the UNGA). See also Andrew Kuchins, Russia and China: The
Ambivalent Embrace, 106 CURRENT HISTORY 321, 324–25 (2007); H. BELOPOLSKY, RUSSIA AND THE
CHALLENGERS: RUSSIAN ALIGNMENT WITH CHINA, IRAN AND IRAQ IN THE UNIPOLAR ERA 65–96 (2009)
(noting the alignments between Russia and China in the UN over various issues).
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Figure 5-3: Cluster Analysis of Advisory Opinions (1946–1966)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-4 Cluster Analysis of Advisory Opinions (1985–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-5 Cluster Analysis of Contentious Cases (1985–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States

(b) The NATO bloc
Besides the Communist bloc, a cluster formed by the NATO/Western democracy
judges is also identified in the disaggregated analysis. The NATO bloc is especially
observable in the advisory opinion and contentious proceedings in the first period (see infra
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supra Figure 5-3 and infra Figure 5-6). Also, a vague image of the NATO bloc also appears
in the analysis results of contentious proceedings in the second and third periods (infra
Figures 5-7 and 5-8).
In contrast to the compact cluster formed among the Communist judges, the NATO
cluster is formed in a much looser manner. Moreover, the judges from the Central or South
America States are also found to vote closely with those from the NATO States.
Figure 5-6 Cluster Analysis of Contentious Cases (1946–1966)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-7 Cluster Analysis of Contentious Cases (1967–1984)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-8 Cluster Analysis of Contentious Cases (1985–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States
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With regard to the size of the voting bloc, in most time-periods, the NATO bloc
consists of more than five judges and is larger than the Communist bloc. The NATO bloc’s
power is especially observable in the analysis of contentious cases in the first period (supra
Figure 5-6) where the Western democracies and the states from the American regions
cluster together, forming a dominating group in the Court. Even after the reduction of some
of the seats held by these countries after the 1960s, these two regions together still hold
more than a third of the seats on the bench.286 Given its size, the NATO bloc is evidently
more influential than the others, and their collective power should not be underestimated.
As the size of the voting bloc is interconnected with how the seats in the ICJ are distributed,
this somewhat explains why the African and Asian countries have constantly called to have
more seats distributed to their region. As already discussed in Chapter 2, even today, the
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Just to refresh the memory, the modern composition of the Court consists of “three judges from the

Americas, one always being from the USA, the two others normally from Latin America, occasionally with
a Canadian; three Africans, always including one from a North African Arab State; three Asians, always
including one from the PRC and another from an Arab State; four from western Europe, always one each
from France and the United Kingdom; and two from eastern Europe, one always from the USSR/Russia.”
See KOLB, supra note 35, at 114.
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NATO and the American States together still hold more seats in the ICJ than the others and
may have continued their influence over the decision-making of the ICJ.
Although the Communist and NATO blocs are both identified in the ICJ, these two
blocs do not always co-appear. In contrast to the Communist bloc that appears in advisory
opinion proceedings of the first period and disappears in the second period but is later
revived in the third period, the NATO bloc remains visible almost throughout the Court’s
history (but sometimes formed loosely). However, throughout the Court’s history, except
in the advisory opinion proceeding of the first time-period, where relatively clear
disagreements can be found between the Communist and NATO bloc judges and which
may be inferred as a reflection of Cold War confrontation in the ICJ, there is no other
evidence suggesting that there are systematic clashes between these two groups of judges.
(c) Are there other voting blocs in the ICJ?
In addition to the Cold War confrontation between the East and West, there are also
rumors that there may be a North-South confrontation,287 anti-colonialist and anti-western
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LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 187 (2D ED. 1979); MILTON. KATZ, THE RELEVANCE OF

INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 103–44 (1968). The ICJ was also thought to be biased against weaker
states, see NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 54–55
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movements,288 and even anti-U.S. groups289 in the ICJ. Although political scientists such
as Hovet, Russet, and Holloway have also identified some of these voting blocs in the UN
General Assembly,290 the analyses in this dissertation report no finding of any of these
blocs. Instead, the analyses report two voting blocs formed by the P5 states and the BRIC
countries in the third period.
In the first two periods, the judges from the United States, the Soviet Union, and those
from the other Western European states vote distantly from each other. However, in the
third period, the P5 state judges start to vote coherently. Unlike Peter Ferdinand’s
observation regarding the UN General Assembly’s voting record that reports high

(2005); John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 115
n.33 (1998).
288

Gordon, supra note 126, at 397–98; Weiss, supra note 22, at 123–33; MCWHINNEY, supra note 126, at

64–65, 79.
289

Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (1987); Thomas

M. Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 380–82 (1985); THOMAS FRANCK, JUDGING THE
WORLD COURT 35–38 (1986); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, Termination of the United States Declaration Under
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY
JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 71 (ANTHONY CLARK AREND, ED., 1986).
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See supra note 279.
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disagreement between the P5 countries, 291 the judges from these traditional political
rivalries seem to embrace similar legal opinions between 1985 and 2015 as the
disagreements between them reduced. The only exception to this observation is that the
U.S. judges voted differently from the other four P5 judges in the advisory opinion
proceedings during the third period.
In the third period, the judges from BRIC countries also clustered together in both the
contentious case (supra Figure 5-8) and the advisory opinion proceedings (infra Figure 59, but without India).292 The identification of the BRIC voting bloc in the ICJ nevertheless
echoes Peter Ferdinand’s study in which he concludes that there is “a high and now
growing degree of cohesion among (the) BRICS” in the UN General Assembly.293 It also
hints that the intensification of the cooperation between the countries on economic,
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Ferdinand, supra note 285, at 382.

292

Note that South Africa is not represented in the ICJ. Hence, this dissertation is unable to observe the

voting patterns of the judges from South Africa.
293

Id. at 376. However, the study of Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire later challenges Ferdinand’s conclusion

stating that there are no BRIC, see Bas Hooijmaaijers and Stephan Keukeleire, Voting Cohesion of the
BRICS Countries in the UN General Assembly, 2006.2014: A BRICS Too Far?, 22 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
389, 403 (2016).
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political, and diplomatic issues may also have stimulated the judges from these countries
to vote closely with each other.
Figure 5-9 Cluster Analysis of Advisory Opinions (1985–2015)

BRIC States

2.3 Voting Clusters in the Subsets of Cases
To observe if the judges’ bloc voting behaviors are more active when the Court
adjudicates over certain type(s) of disputes, I divide the contentious cases into six sub165

categories with the categorization method used in Ginsburg and McAdams’ research.294 In
this part, I shall examine the clusters that emerge in these subsets of cases.
In the analyses of the subsets of cases, I am only able to identify voting blocs in cases
relating to use of force disputes and trusteeship matters. The three types of clusters
identified include the NATO bloc (infra Figures 5-10 and 5-11), and two other blocs
formed by former colonial powers and formerly colonized states (reflecting the anticolonial movement), respectively (infra Figure 5-12). The clusters found in the other
subsets of cases seem to be formed quite randomly, and I summarize the findings in Table
5-1 below.
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Introduced earlier in Chapter 1, see supra note 72 (note 72 in Chapter 1).
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Figure 5-10 Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Cases (1946–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-11 Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Cases (1985–2015)

NATO States;

Communist States
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Figure 5-12 Cluster Analysis of Trusteeship Cases (1946–2015)

Former Colonial States;

295

Former Colonized States295

The status of “colonized state” here is determined by whether the state gained its independence after the

end of World War II.
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Table 5-1 Results of the Analyses of the Subsets of Cases
Results

Subset of Cases
1.

Use of Force (T, III)

2.

Trusteeship (T, I)

1.

Property Rights (T, I, III)

2.

Territorial Demarcation (T, I, II, III)

3.

Diplomatic Relations (T, I, III)

4.

Aerial Incidents (T, III)

1.

Trusteeship (II, III)

Excluded due to

2.

Diplomatic Relations (II)

single/no case in the

3.

Use of Force (I, II)

subset

4.

Property Rights (II)

5.

Aerial Incidents (I, II)

Clusters Identified

No Cluster

Note: ‘T,' ‘I,' ‘II,' and ‘III’ in the parentheses represent four time-periods.
‘T’ represents 1946-2015; ‘I’ represents 1946-1966; ‘II’ represents 19671984; ‘III’ represents 1985-2015.

2.4 The NAM Bloc in the ICJ
Since the Third World countries adhere to the Policy of Non-Alignment (also known
as the Non-Alignment Movement, NAM) in the United Nations, 296 I am interested in
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Another noticeable group or cohesion in the international organizations is the Group of 77 (G77).

Although the G77 and the NAM bloc are frequently discussed together and are even said to have later
emerged, the mandate and the origin of these two group are still entirely different. See Carol Geldart &
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learning if the judges from these countries also form a NAM bloc and vote distinctly from
the superpowers. As the NAM group has a sizeable number of judges in the Court, it would
be interesting to learn if and how the Court is influenced (or not affected) by the judges
from countries of the NAM group.
Although the NAM bloc is often characterized as a group independent of the
superpowers, this is a false description of this group’s features. 297 As Peter Lyon
accurately describes, non-alignment does not mean isolationism or neutrality in the sense
of strict military and diplomatic equidistance between the superpowers.298 The essence of
this policy is to allow states to decide issues on their merits without being influenced by
external pressure and domination.299 As Fidel Castro declared in the Havana Declaration

Peter Lyon, The Group of 77: A Perspective View, 57(1) INT’L AFF. 79, 79–81 (1981); Peter Lyon, NonAlignment at the Summits: From Belgrade 1961 to Havana 1979—A Perspective View, 41(1) INDIAN J.
POL. SCI.132, 150 (1980).
297

Holloway & Tomlinson, supra note 194, at 231–33; Voeten, supra note 194, at 199–201. The NAM77

bloc emerged in the 1970s, as this bloc was not reported in the studies of UN General Assembly voting
during the 1960s, see e.g. Lijphart, supra note 168.
298

Lyon, supra note 296, at 149.

299

Surander Singh, NAM in the Contemporary World Order: An Analysis, 70(4) INDIAN J. POL. SCI. 1213,

1214 (2009).
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of 1979: “[T]he quintessence of the nonalinement policy, in accordance with its original
principles and fundamental nature, is the struggle against imperialism, colonialism,
neocolonialism, apartheid, … , as well as the struggle against the policies of big powers or
blocs.”300 In other words, the NAM group may be a bloc independent of both Communist
and NATO blocs.
The NAM bloc is a cohesion of countries with differences and consists of a mixture
of countries from the Afro-Asia bloc, the Muslim bloc, the Latin American bloc, and
countries with different economic development statuses. 301 Although the loose and
flexible criteria for membership and the lack of development agenda were said to be
problems limiting the development of this group,302 these are also the greatest features of
the NAM group. Because of the NAM bloc’s decentralized organization, each country is
independent in developing and deciding its policy based upon the merits of the issue.303
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Speech by Cuban President Fidel Castro to the 34th UN General Assembly: Meets Officials at UN:

Departs for Home, available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1979/19791012.html (last visited
July 12, 2017).
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Holloway & Tomlinson, supra note 194, at 231–33; Voeten, supra note 194, at 199–201.
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Singh, supra note 299, 1223.

303

Id. at 1214–15, 1223.
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The non-alignment policy also reduces the risk that the decision-making of the group will
be dominated by the cohesive will of certain parties.
In this dissertation, the analyses report no cluster formed by judges from the NAM
group. Nevertheless, this result of “non-clustering” may, in fact, suggest that the judges
from the NAM bloc countries adhere to the non-alignment policy in the ICJ. The finding
that the judges from the NAM group randomly cluster with the judges from the NATO and
Communist blocs is also similar to political scientists’ observations of the NAM group’s
voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. 304 As the NAM group has the largest
number of judges in the ICJ, the non-alignment movement of these judges prevents the
Court from being dominated by the superpowers or a particular group of judges. The lack
of a strong mandate among the NAM group also enables the NAM bloc judges to decide
cases more liberally and without political pressure. The existence of NAM blocs within the
ICJ may have helped to make the ICJ’s decision-making less politicized.

304

In Erik Voeten’s analysis, the NAM group’s votes are scattered between the East and West group and

they joined different groups depending on the issue at stake. See Voeten, supra note 194, at 203–05.
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3. The Regression Analysis
3.1 Research Design
Despite the efforts in visualizing the clusters to make the identification of voting blocs
easier, the visual identification only enables us to detect three voting blocs. Hence, in the
second part of this chapter, I use regression analysis to help to test if political/military
alliances are significant variables that associate with the proximity between the judges’
voting patterns, even net of other possible confounding factors. The use of regression
analysis not only enhances the accuracy of the observation but may also help us to compare
the degree of correlation between different variables.
In this section, I develop a set of regression models to examine if the voting distances
between the judges correlate to the characteristics shared between the judges’ home
countries, such as political and military alignments, religion, level of democracy,
geographical location, and economic development. The two political and military
alignments examined are NATO membership and the Communist (Warsaw Pact) bloc. For
religion, I examine if the judges from Christian countries (also reflecting the majority of

174

Western Civilization) voted more closely with each other.305 The level of democracy is
evaluated by the democracy score provided by the Polity III dataset compiled by the Center
for Systematic Peace which evaluates a country’s democracy scores with a set of criteria.306
The regional variables tested here are Latin America, Middle East (also representing the
Muslim community), and Africa matches to see if the judges from the same geographical

305

Information regarding the major religious practices in each country is derived from the World Facts and

Figure, the original website no longer functions but an archived webpage is preserved. See Religion
Statistics by Country, World Facts and Figures.com, accessible at https://archive.is/WLcQr (last visited
June 13, 2017).
306

The Center for Systematic Peace compiled a Polity III dataset providing countries’ year by year

democracy scores calculated in accordance with a set of criteria including: (1) Competitiveness of
Executive Recruitment; (2) Openness of Executive Recruitment; (3) Constraint on Chief Executive; and (4)
Competitiveness of Political Participation. The scores ranged from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (least
democratic), with an additional three standardized authority codes (-66, -77, -88) each indicating the
countries in interruption periods (e.g. country under foreign occupation), interregnum periods (e.g., there is
a collapse of central political authority), and transition periods (e.g., when new governments are planned).
For further detail, see CENTER FOR SYSTEMATIC PEACE, POLITY IV PROJECT: DATASET USERS’ MANUAL
V2016

13–20, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2016.pdf (last visited June 4,

2017). The democracy scores used in this dissertation derive from the polity2 column of the dataset. The
democracy scores of a country within a specific time period is calculated by averaging the country’s
democracy scores within that period. For the purpose of this analysis I rescaled the democracy scores from
0 (least democratic) to 2 (most democratic). The Polity IV Project’s website and database can be accessed
at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last visited June 4, 2017).
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region vote more closely with each other. Although the best option to evaluate economic
development should be Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, there is no available
dataset that provides all states’ GDP covering the ICJ’s entire history.307 Alternatively, I
use OECD membership as indication of economic development. Lastly, in order to
examine if the judges that frequently hear cases together share higher agreement with each
other, the opportunity match is set to examine if the number of co-voting experiences
correlates with the voting distance between the judges.308 The results of the regression
analyses are presented in Tables 5-2 and 5-3.
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The best dataset I can find is that compiled by the World Bank. However, the data for the GNP of

countries in the World Bank database is also incomplete.
308

The ‘opportunity match’ only applies to the observation of ‘Disagreement’ since this column observes

the actual voting agreement between the judges where not every judge has the chance to vote with one
another. Since ‘L2’ measures the distance between judges that never voted together before, voting
opportunity is no longer a variable.
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Table 5-2 OLS Regression Models of Bilateral Disagreement: Contentious Cases
1946-2015
VARIABLES

natomatch
christianmatch
oecdmatch
communistmatch
latinmatch
africamatch
middleeastmatch

Constant

1967-1984

1985-2015

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

-25.059***

-18.489***

-33.555***

-19.923*

-19.295#

-21.039#

4.021

0.140

(4.101)

(3.943)

(9.649)

(9.201)

(10.758)

(11.177)

(4.719)

(4.618)

1.300

2.425

-5.106

1.611

3.713

10.230**

-13.333***

-4.073#

(1.702)

(1.697)

(3.414)

(3.343)

(2.974)

(3.347)

(2.291)

(2.238)

15.408***

10.048**

11.003#

3.673

0.956

3.056

-4.712

-0.874

(3.152)

(3.182)

(6.404)

(6.839)

(5.271)

(5.799)

(3.496)

(3.404)

-18.760**

-6.810

-9.939

-8.443

-32.912

-27.824

-6.206

-8.546

(6.770)

(6.155)

(16.399)

(13.922)

(23.395)

(24.343)

(6.606)

(6.867)

-12.025**

-0.910

-12.204*

-6.026

-7.918

-9.076

7.222

1.900

(4.113)

(4.167)

(5.899)

(6.149)

(7.753)

(12.231)

(6.785)

(7.562)

0.188

1.746

-

-

(5.741)

(6.468)

2.932

-3.488

(6.781)

(8.641)

opportunity
democmatch

1946-1966

-

-

-0.414

11.177

-1.204

0.042

(13.552)

(14.031)

(5.402)

(6.853)

7.302

10.353

13.984*

-10.318

(9.667)

(16.971)

(6.578)

(9.023)

-0.065***

-0.531**

0.485

-0.007

(0.015)

(0.189)

(0.301)

(0.017)

4.942*

2.770

-1.886

-9.671*

-35.938*

-32.788#

10.287*

0.792

(2.070)

(2.357)

(4.683)

(4.549)

(16.633)

(17.013)

(4.311)

(4.932)

49.666***

24.043***

63.940***

37.793***

54.427***

17.463***

35.739***

18.716***

(1.135)

(1.357)

(2.473)

(3.356)

(1.792)

(3.328)

(1.200)

(1.656)

Observations

1,128

624

325

246

300

238

496

362

R-squared

0.057

0.077

0.070

0.080

0.037

0.077

0.118

0.021

Number of
proceedings

108

25

13

70

Number of Claims

322

38

24

260

# p≤.10, * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001, two-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses. L2 refers to Euclidean distance between two countries
with respect to voting consistency vis-à-vis P5 judges (or P4 when China is excluded between 1966 and 1984). “Disagreement” refers to actual
percentage disagreement between countries that voted together
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Table 5-3 OLS Regression Models of Bilateral Disagreement: Advisory Opinions
1946-2015

1946-1966

1967-1984

1985-2015

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

natomatch

-18.016**
(5.782)

-11.045*
(5.661)

-66.004***
(15.517)

5.948
(13.989)

6.705
(20.036)

-3.225
(15.380)

-4.980
(6.172)

-3.947
(5.235)

christianmatch

10.162***
(2.513)

9.128***
(2.429)

6.343
(6.216)

13.042**
(5.122)

1.374
(5.824)

6.309
(4.741)

-11.988***
(3.260)

-2.712
(2.707)

-1.220
(4.459)

1.260
(4.581)

19.056#
(10.340)

-14.348
(10.031)

-15.359
(9.886)

2.137
(8.442)

6.484
(4.653)

3.887
(3.853)

-20.154*
(9.548)

-8.321
(8.265)

-64.591*
(26.272)

-22.394
(19.193)

-19.557
(43.588)

0.818
(32.408)

-7.149
(8.639)

-14.281#
(7.395)

latinmatch

7.895
(5.825)

-0.245
(6.227)

3.586
(9.466)

-7.643
(8.888)

22.369
(18.338)

-26.566
(18.784)

12.663
(8.943)

-11.381
(9.932)

africamatch

10.011
(9.551)

7.254
(11.537)

-

-

-1.825
(25.243)

-5.520
(18.599)

10.101
(8.608)

19.955#
(11.185)

middleeastmatch

-2.245
(11.656)

3.057
(14.860)

-

-

15.873
(18.013)

-20.731
(32.030)

32.502**
(11.029)

19.294
(13.677)

VARIABLES

oecdmatch
communistmatch

opportunity

-0.038
(0.108)

democmatch
constant

-0.622*
(0.318)

1.525*
(0.716)

0.214
(0.162)

7.527**
(3.044)

2.157
(3.440)

-12.016
(8.023)

1.416
(6.643)

-31.299
(31.012)

-14.759
(22.813)

10.741#
(6.158)

14.940*
(6.315)

60.313***
(1.677)

19.305***
(1.967)

77.087***
(4.969)

32.009***
(4.824)

86.451***
(3.430)

19.206***
(4.639)

49.546***
(1.670)

12.972***
(2.128)

Observations

1,035

543

276

209

276

221

435

291

R-squared

0.041

0.035

0.089

0.065

0.023

0.048

0.071

0.066

Number of
proceedings

22

8

6

8

Number of claims

68

21

16

31

# p≤.10, * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001, two-tailed tests; Standard errors in parentheses. L2 refers to the Euclidean distance between two
countries with respect to voting consistency vis-à-vis P5 judges (or P4 when China is excluded between 1966 and 1984). “Disagreement” refers
to actual percentage disagreement between countries that voted together

3.2 Regression Analysis of Contentious Cases and Advisory Opinions
Tables 5-4 and 5-5 report above two sets of regression results regarding contentious
cases and advisory opinions. The ‘Disagreement’ column reflects the changes to the actual
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co-voting between the judges, whereas the ‘L2’ column reflects the change of relative
distance between the judges computed with the Euclidean distance as introduced in Chapter
3. The number of observation (N) under the ‘L2’ and ‘Agreement’ is different because ‘L2’
reports the relative distance between the judges’ votes even if they have never voted
together while the ‘Disagreement’ only measures the voting distance between judges that
have voted together. Accordingly, ‘L2’ observes more pairs of judges than ‘Disagreement.’
A negative coefficient in the ‘L2’ and ‘Disagreement’ columns indicates a decrease in
voting distance between the two judges’ when their countries share the common features;
alternately, a positive coefficient indicates that when the feature of the judges’ home
countries matches, the distance between the two judges’ votes increases (i.e., the
disagreement increases). As I aim to observe the variables causing the judges to vote
cohesively, I pay special attention to the variables that report a negative coefficient.
In both Tables 5-4 and 5-5, the results confirm our previous observation that NATO
and Communist matches are two significant factors correlating to the reduce of the voting
distance between the judges. Moreover, the Communist match is the only variable that
reports a (significant) negative coefficient throughout the Court’s history and in every
divided period in both contentious cases and advisory opinion proceedings. Although the
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NATO match also constantly reports a negative coefficient, the scale of its correlation with
the judges’ voting distances seems to be diminishing. The significant negative coefficient
of the NATO match starts to weaken after the first period and almost disappears in the last
period. Unlike the consistent negative coefficient reported among the Communist match,
the NATO match is no longer a significant variable that correlates to shortening the voting
distance between the judges after the end of the Cold War. Instead, in the third period, the
Christianity match seems to have replaced the NATO match and has become an influential
variable that correlates with the clustering behavior of the ICJ judges. In the analysis of
both contentious cases and advisory opinions in the third period, the Christianity match
reports a significant negative coefficient while the influence of the NATO match turns
marginal. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the members of NATO are mostly also
Christian states. In other words, these two matching groups highly overlap with one another.
In a separate analysis removing the Christianity variable with the other variables
unchanged, in the third period, the significance of the NATO match increased.
Like Posner and Figueredo’s research, the study in this dissertation is also troubled by
the multicollinearity problem since the features of the predictor variables correlate with
one another. For instance, many countries that are NATO members are also OECD
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members, many Christianity countries are also NATO and OECD members and share a
high democracy level rating. Table 5-4 below presents an example of the results when I
tested the different combination of variables in the regression. In the first and second sets
of analyses where the NATO and Christianity matches were set as the variable while the
OECD match is excluded, both the NATO and Christianity matches report a significant
negative coefficient. However, in the third set of analyses where all three matches are tested
together, the NATO and Christianity matches’ influences disappear while the OECD match
reports a (significant) negative coefficient.
Table 5-4 OLS Regression Models of Bilateral Disagreement:
Contentious Cases (1985–2015)

VARIABLES

natomatch
christianmatch

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

L2

disagreement

-9.210*

-3.413

4.021

0.140

(3.738)

(3.474)

(4.719)

(4.618)

-14.188***

-4.330*

-13.333***

-4.073#

(2.008)

(1.998)

(2.291)

(2.238)

-4.712

-0.874

(3.496)

(3.404)

oecdmatch
… the other variables and results omitted.

# p≤.10, * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001, two-tailed tests; Standard errors in parentheses.
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With regard to the other variables, the ‘Latin-American’ match also occasionally
reports negative coefficients; the democracy level match reports a significant negative
coefficient in the analysis of advisory proceedings. Meanwhile, the African and the Middle
East geographical matches show weak correlation with the voting distances between the
judges.
3.3 Regression Analysis of Subsets of Cases
Let’s now analyze the subsets of cases categorized by dispute types and by different
time periods to observe the variables’ influence in a smaller context. The analysis results
are provided in Tables 5-5 to 5-8.
The Communist match continues to report a significant negative coefficient in almost
all types of cases across the Court’s history. On the other hand, due to the multicollinearity
problem, the NATO match reports a less significant negative coefficient but remains
noticeable. The NATO match’s influence is especially observable in the overall analysis
of Territorial Demarcation and Aerial Incident cases, and in Use of Force and Diplomatic
Relationship disputes in all three periods. The OECD and Christianity matches also report
significant negative coefficients in a wide range of cases, especially in Trustee cases.
Meanwhile, regional geographical matches such as the Middle East and Latin American
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matches report weak correlation with the clustering of judges but are still occasionally
noticeable.
The regression results reported in Tables 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 support the findings of the
previous section where we argued that judges are likely to vote closely with those from
countries that share common features with their home country. The identified influential
extrajudicial factors affecting the clustering of judges include shared political ideology
(Communist match), shared culture and religious practices (Christianity match, may also
represent civilization), military alignment (NATO match), similar degree of economic and
democracy development (OECD and democracy level matches), and shared geographical
location (Latin America, Middle East, and Africa matches). Although the density of the
clusters and the significance of the variables’ influences vary, the clustering behavior is
widely observable in almost all types of cases and every period throughout the Court’s
history.
Furthermore, the cohesive voting behaviors among judges from BRIC countries are
also verified in the regression analysis (Table 5–9). Between 1985 and 2015, judges from
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BRIC countries voted closely with each other in both contentious and advisory opinion
proceedings, as the analysis reports a significant negative coefficient. The only type of
dispute in which the judges from BRIC countries did not show cohesive voting behaviors
was the disputes over Property Rights. As the BRIC bloc consists of groups of judges from
Table 5-9 OLS Regression Models of Bilateral Disagreement: 1985-2015
(adding BRIC match as variable)
Contentious
Cases
L2

Advisory
Opinions
L2

Territorial
Demarcation
L2

-17.781*
(8.449)
3.921
(4.703)
-13.457***
(2.283)
-4.898
(3.485)
-4.553
(6.630)
7.060
(6.762)
-1.482
(5.385)
13.698*
(6.556)
10.127*
(4.297)
36.026***
(1.204)

-30.000**
(11.000)
-5.143
(6.126)
-12.208***
(3.237)
6.112
(4.620)
-4.407
(8.633)
12.334
(8.877)
9.552
(8.546)
31.952**
(10.949)
10.448#
(6.113)
50.096***
(1.670)

-14.310
(10.044)
1.264
(5.590)
-11.924***
(2.714)
-8.668*
(4.143)
-12.804
(7.881)
7.561
(8.038)
4.885
(6.401)
15.104*
(7.793)
8.985#
(5.108)
36.079***
(1.431)

Observations
R-squared

496
0.126

435
0.087

496
0.113

465
0.040

Number of
proceedings

70

8

24

25

VARIABLES
bricmatch
natomatch
christianmatch
oecdmatch
communistmatch
latinmatch
africamatch
middleeastmatch
democmatch
Constant

Use of
Force
L2

Diplomatic
Relationship
L2

Aerial
Incident
L2

Trusteeship
L2

Property
Rights
L2

-57.794
(39.810)
-1.517
(34.359)
-29.022*
(14.511)
23.295
(27.510)
1.546
(39.810)
-26.475
(65.636)
-89.864
(64.968)
102.417
(64.968)
91.422
(65.636)
89.864***
(7.999)

-1.302
(77.472)
61.211***
(11.010)

6.485
(31.239)
25.621
(17.615)
-20.493*
(8.627)
-2.908
(12.201)
-45.476
(31.239)
-3.672
(22.021)
-7.554
(29.725)
39.561
(29.725)
-25.550
(19.915)
50.146***
(5.078)

276
0.082

120
0.114

91
0.153

190
0.078

11

7

1

4

-9.219
-1.249
(7.993)
(8.233)
-9.852*
-18.820***
(4.453)
(5.550)
-3.260
-0.502
(2.176)
(2.853)
1.816
5.609
(3.328)
(3.845)
-1.723
-11.549
(6.270)
(8.230)
7.009
23.380*
(6.386)
(11.616)
4.399
1.802
(5.117)
(8.144)
12.154
-16.629*
(7.987)
(8.173)
-1.083
-1.652
(2.252)
(7.160)
44.123*** 30.591***
(1.256)
(1.598)

-29.954
(93.411)
59.909
(45.696)
-59.909**
(19.003)
-61.211#
(35.674)
-31.257
(54.510)
-1.302
(77.472)
-61.211
(76.669)
-

260
31
86
86
52
15
2
21
Number of Claims
# p≤.10, * p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001, two-tailed tests; Standard errors in parentheses. L2 refers to the Euclidean distance between
two countries with respect to voting consistency vis-à-vis P5 judges. There is only one ‘Trusteeship’ case in this period.
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countries that are going through rapid economic growth309 and have established political
collaboration with one another, this finding again suggests how the match of wealth and
political alignments between the judges’ home countries are associated with the closeness
between the judges’ voting patterns.

4. Do the Voting Blocs Affect the Function of the ICJ?
The immediate question that follows after affirming the existence of the voting blocs
is whether and how these voting blocs influence the function of the ICJ, and if the existence
of voting blocs affects the states’ willingness to use this forum. Although the analysis
methods deployed in this research do not address these questions directly, for two reasons,
I surmise that the influence of these voting blocs is insignificant.
First of all, although I have identified the voting blocs that exist in the ICJ and the
variables that correlate with the voting distances between the judges, nothing in the
findings suggests that the judges in different voting blocs disagree with each other

309

The term BRIC(S) was invented by Jim O’Neill, an analysist at Goldman Sachs, as an acronym of four

countries at a similar stage of advanced economic development. But later in 2010, BRIC became a formal
institution where the countries held summits regularly and discussed possible political and economic
cooperation between these countries.
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constantly. Furthermore, as I have pointed out in Chapter 4 that the majority of ICJ
decisions were made with the support of more than 80 percent of the bench, the high rate
of support over the decisions also suggests that no systematic confrontation exists in the
Court.310
The second reason to surmise that the voting blocs in the ICJ only share limited
influence is that the power of these blocs is limited by their size. Throughout the ICJ’s
history, the NATO bloc is the largest voting bloc identified in this study.311 However,
under the unwritten decision to compose the Court with the ‘equitable geographical
distribution’ formula, the number of judges from NATO countries is still limited and rarely
exceeds five. Although there lacks a justifiable reason to distribute the seats by
geographical region and allow the Western European states better representation in the
Court, the equitable distribution formula nevertheless ensures that no single group acquires

310

75 percent of contentious cases and 61 percent of advisory opinions are decided with more than 80

percent of the judges supporting the decision. For details, see Chapter 4 Section 1.
311

The Christianity bloc may be even larger, however their influence is not as significant. Also, the NAM

group also has a greater number of judges in it. But as the NAM group judges do not cluster with each
other, their influence is also insignificant.
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the majority of votes on the bench. 312 Accordingly, the influence of these groups is
restrained.
With regard to whether the existence of voting blocs affects states’ willingness to
utilize the ICJ as a dispute settlement forum, the suggestive answer is also negative. First,
besides some political statements, there lacks indication that states refrain from utilizing
the ICJ because voting clusters exist in the Court. In Chapter 2, despite territorial
demarcation being the type of case most frequently brought before the ICJ, while aerial
incidents are the least frequent, voting blocs are still identified in the analyses of territorial
demarcation cases, just as they appear in other types of cases. There lacks a correlation
between the numbers of cases brought to the ICJ and whether voting blocs exist in the ICJ.
From a practical perspective, as the ones utilizing the forum, states should have the
best knowledge and awareness about the existence of voting blocs in the Court. 313

312

Except in the very early stage of the Court during which the NATO/American judges combined hold the

majority of the seats. However, it should be noted that the NATO and American groups do not always
agree with each other.
313

Most parties would at least have an judge of their preference joining the adjudication. To a certain

extend, these national judges may share some insights or their observations with their appointers. Of
course, this is still unproven speculations.
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However, if the states know about the existence of voting blocs or at least speculated about
their existence but still decide to utilize this forum, it either indicates that the voting blocs
have limited power, or that the states do not mind (or even prefer) to use a court composed
of judges that vote in a manner reflecting the alignments between their home countries.
There simply lacks indications showing that the existence of voting blocs in the ICJ has a
impact on the states’ willingness to utilize the Court. Following this discussion, one may
perhaps rethink the debates between Eric Posner and John Yoo, and Laurence Helfer and
Anne-Marie Slaughter in which they argued over the question of if a dependent or
independent tribunal is more efficient (preferred) in resolving disputes. 314 However,
noticing such debate is beyond the scope of dissertation, I do not comment on these matters.

314

In the debate, Ponser and Yoo took the position that dependent courts are more effective than

independent courts, and international tribunals are more effective (in helping states to resolve disputes)
when they act consistently with the interests of the states that create them. Helfer and Slaughter argue
otherwise. In Posner and Yoo’s observation, the ICJ is categorized as a “dependent tribunal’ See Posner &
Yoo, supra note 127; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 106.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter reports three critical findings. First, through conducting cluster analyses,
I have identified the existence of the NATO and Communist blocs in various periods of
the ICJ. Moreover, I have also suggested that the NAM group judges adhering to the nonalignment practices may have ensured the impartialness of the Court. Second, in the
regression analysis, in addition to confirming that the judges from both the NATO or
Communist states are likely to vote closer with one another, I have also reported that
religion (Christianity) match, geographical (Latin America, Africa) matches, level of
democracy and economic development all to a certain extent correlate with the voting
distance between the judges. Accordingly, the findings of this chapter challenge Weiss and
McWhinney’s conclusion that no alignments are formed among the ICJ judges. 315
However, because of the limited size of the voting blocs identified, I also argue that these
voting blocs do not necessarily undermine the impartiality of the Court.
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Weiss, supra note 22, at 129–31; MCWHINNEY, supra note 282, at 38–40.
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Conclusions and Future Research Directions

This dissertation is about the ICJ judges’ voting preferences and the clustering
patterns reflected in the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors. Although all judges and judicial
institutions are expected to adjudicate disputes and decide cases considering nothing but
the law and the fact, courts and judges are never machine-like mechanisms that can make
decisions without considering or being affected by extra-legal factors. Judges’ voting
behavior is the result of complex processes and judges’ decision-making is not only
affected by the facts of the case and the applicable laws but is also affected by a variety of
personal and social factors.316 Just as Judge Schwebel vividly quoted from Milton Katz
that everyone is a prisoner of their own experience,317 every individual’s personal life
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See e.g., Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26

LOY. L.A. L. REV. 993 (1993); Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism,
Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419 (1992). The famous quote from
Justice Holmes – “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience” – vividly describes this
phenomenon.
317

Stephen M. Schwebel, Foreign Policy and the Government Legal Adviser, 2 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77

(1972); A similar statement was made by Edward Murrow: “Everyone is a prisoner of his own experiences.
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experience, educational and social background, social status and career experience all have
influence over a person’s personality and values. Eventually, these influences are reflected
in one’s decision-making, including the judges’ votes and decisions regarding cases. For
those interested in evaluating the judicial institution’s performances and the judges’
behaviors, instead of debating whether the judges are impartial or biased, and spending
valuable time deciding the standard to evaluate impartiality, the more practical mission to
take on is to learn about the actual practices of the court. Only by learning from the judges’
and courts’ actual practices can we learn about if and perhaps how judicial decision-making
is affected by any unwanted factors.
This dissertation started with the goal of portraying and assessing the ICJ judges’
voting behaviors. The underlying purpose was to verify the long-debated question of
whether ICJ judges cluster into voting blocs and to provide empirical evidence to show the
existence of the voting blocs and observe the blocs’ features. In particular, I was interested
in assessing if ICJ judges form into voting blocs that are similar to the blocs that their home
countries form in international organizations like the UN General Assembly or Security

No one can eliminate prejudices - just recognize them.” Edward R. Murrow, television broadcast,
December 31, 1955.
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Council. With surprising success, this dissertation has identified several voting blocs that
emerge in different periods of ICJ’s history. With the help of hierarchical cluster analysis,
this dissertation is able to visualize the voting blocs and present them in dendrograms. We
have made the judges’ clustering patterns easier to detect and observe.
Among the blocs that I have detected, the most critical finding is perhaps the
identification of two voting blocs formed by judges from NATO countries and those from
Communist states. The identification of NATO and Communist blocs in the ICJ not only
refutes the findings of several earlier studies which deny the existence of voting blocs in
the Court but also confirms that Asian and African countries’ concerns that the judges from
the East and the West each show coherent voting patterns are not moot. Moreover, together
with the detection of BRIC and NAM blocs, the voting blocs identified in this research
share astonishing similarity with the voting blocs found in the observation of states’ voting
behaviors in the UN General Assembly. Since the ICJ and UN General Assembly serve
entirely different purposes and one would not expect the members of these two institutions
to show similar voting behaviors, instinctively, this leads us to speculate on whether there
is any correlation between the emergence of clusters and extra-judicial factors, such as the
political and ideological alignments between the judges’ home countries.
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With the help of OLS regression analysis, this dissertation showed that the emergence
of voting blocs is robust to controls. In particular, I have identified some of the factors that
statistically correlate with the emergence of voting blocs. Factors such as the commonality
of the political ideology adopted in the judges’ home countries (NATO/Communist
matches), the similarity in the degree of economic or democractic developments (OECD
membership/democracy score matches), and even shared religion and civilization
(Christianity matches) between the countries were all found to correlate with the similarity
between the judges’ voting patterns. Because the regression analyses can only confirm
correlations between factors and the observed subjects but cannot determine causation
linkages between them, the factors that were found to show correlation may be proxies of
other factors. This finding nevertheless successfully shows the likelihood that the decisionmaking of the ICJ is affected by extra-judicial factors.
In addition to the above-mentioned substantive findings, this dissertation’s
contributions also shine from a methodological perspective. First, although Euclidean
distance is commonly used by social and political scientists to measure the similarity and
dissimilarity between subjects’ voting patterns, this dissertation is the first using it to assess
the similarity and dissimilarity between the ICJ judges’ voting patterns. Through
195

experimenting with the use of this analysis method, this dissertation introduces a new
analysis method that can be use by future studies. I hope that the exchange of analysis
methodology between different fields of research may stimulate the development of new
research and enrich the scholarship. Furthermore, as the use of the Euclidean method
allows this dissertation to overcome the obstacle in assessing the similarity and
dissimilarity between the voting behaviors of judges that have no co-voting experiences,
this dissertation is thus able to portray the clustering behaviors among all judges across the
Court’s history. The Euclidean distance measuring method also enables this dissertation to
refrain from discarding a tremendous number of votes from the analysis like the earlier
studies which use Rice-Beyle cluster bloc analysis and is thus able to assess the ICJ judges’
voting behaviors more comprehensively than any other prior studies.
This dissertation contributes to the scholarship in many other aspects. For instance,
this dissertation provides an updated report showing that the national judges (judges that
are either from or appointed by the party states) continue to show a strong tendency to vote
in favor of their home countries or appointors. Like the findings reported in Suh, Hensley,
Samore, Smith, and Posner and de Figueiredo’s studies, this dissertation also finds that this
unique voting preference of national judges has not changed throughout the ICJ’s history.
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With regard to the analysis of the influence of nationality on ad hoc judges’ voting
behaviors, I have shown that regardless of whether the judges are nationals of the party
states or if they are from third states, on average ad hoc judges voted for their appointors
around 80 percent of the time. Meanwhile, I have also pointed out that states do not seem
to care about the ad hoc judges’ country of origin, as nearly half of them are selected from
third states. In rare occasions, countries even select a national of the opposing party as their
ad hoc judge.
Although this dissertation cannot address every question and speculation that people
hold against the ICJ, it is hoped that this project has at least helped the legal community to
learn things about the ICJ that have not previously been proven. It is also hoped that the
use of empirical methods in this dissertation can stimulate international legal scholars to
assess international legal questions with new approaches and to verify untested theories.
The dataset compiled during this research can also be a valuable asset to later researchers
as it can save future studies from repeating the time- and effort-consuming data collection
processes.
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1. Research Limits and Future Research Plans
No research is perfect, and this dissertation is no exception. There are many places in
this dissertation that can be further improved and supplemented. In spite of the excitement
of reaching some preliminary achievements in reporting the ICJ judges’ collective voting
behaviors, the findings of this dissertation only reveal the tip of the iceberg and an essential
part of the ICJ and its judges’ decision-making behaviors remains unknown. For example,
although this dissertation finds that national judges are keen to vote in favor of their
appointors and nominators, the mechanisms causing national judges to act in such a way
remain unknown. It is still unclear what the qualifications are that countries look for when
they select or nominate (ad hoc) judges. Neither do we know why some countries prefer to
nominate ad hoc judges from a third country instead of appointing one of their nationals to
serve in such a position. This is not to mention how little we know about the internal
decision-making processes within the ICJ and how the judges exchange ideas before
making their final decisions. There is still much that we can and need to learn about the
ICJ.
With this opportunity, I would like to propose a few possible approaches that future
researchers, and perhaps myself, can take to deepen the study of ICJ performance and the
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judges’ voting behaviors. The first approach worth trying is to focus the study on cases
where “contentions truly arise.” In Chapter 4, I have pointed out that most of the ICJ
decisions were made with the support of nearly 90 percent of the judges and only less than
16 percent of the decisions were made with more than three judges dissenting.318 In other
words, the clusters and voting blocs identified in this dissertation are possibly the reflection
of dissents that arise in that handful of cases. By narrowing the scope of analysis, we can
not only differentiate between cases where voting blocs exist and where they were decided
in a unanimous manner but can also identify the types of cases where disagreements arise
more commonly and scenarios in which judges are more likely to disagree with each other.
Scrutinizing the features of the voting blocs identified in this dissertation is another
direction worth investigating. While this dissertation uses statistical methods to identify
the voting blocs and assess the clustering behaviors from a macro perspective, these
identified blocs can be further assessed from a micro perspective. For example, from the
quantitative analysis, we have learned that judges from the BRIC countries showed
cohesive voting patterns. However, what we still do not know is the reason why these
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See Chapter 4, Section 1, especially Tables 4-1 to 4-4.
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judges voted closely with each other. Neither do we know if these judges voted in the same
way out of mere coincidence or if they acted cohesively due to other reasons. Much of
these above-listed questions can only be answered by research that qualitatively studies the
judgments and the judges’ attached opinions. Through qualitative analyses of the
judgments and judges’ opinions, we may be able to observe if the judges in the same voting
bloc adhere to the same teaching of international law and advance similar legal doctrines
in their opinions. These analyses may also allow us to examine if judges advance cultural
or geopolitical considerations in their opinion and to explore how factors like politics and
cultures influence the judges’ decision-making. In doing so, future studies may explore if
regionalism in international law has developed coinciding with the ICJ bloc voting
behavior, and address questions like whether international law with Eurocentric
characteristics predominates the ICJ.
Furthermore, it is said that judges with diplomat backgrounds are keener to execute
the will of their government than those selected from academia or the highest court of
justice. These assertions have not been empirically tested. Future studies look into the
judges’ career paths and their educational backgrounds to examine the difference between
voting patterns of judges selected from different training backgrounds. For those interested
200

in assessing how the judges’ home countries’ attitudes and opinions over the matter affect
the judges’ decision-making, they can also replicate Il Suh’s analysis and observe if the
judges’ decision-making matches the opinions expressed by the judges’ home countries
over the adjudicated matters.
Although many of the above-listed research directions suggest the use of qualitative
methods to scrutinize the issues relating to the ICJ, quantitative and qualitative analyses
are both capable tools for evaluating the ICJ and its judges’ performance and are equally
recommended to be deployed. I do not prejudice one against the other.
2. An Inconvenient Truth, But What Next?
As a judicial institution, the ICJ has been viewed as a sacred institution whose
reputation cannot and should not be tainted. Perhaps out of the same consideration, many
scholars choose to believe that the impartiality of the judges can be ensured through the
swearing of oaths and other weak institutional arrangements. In contrast with the states’
speculative attitudes, scholars seem rather reluctant to challenge the presumption that the
decision-making of ICJ judges is unaffected by extra-legal factors, fearing these allegations
would harm the ICJ’s reputation. It is not only astonishing to see how scholars are willing
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to believe in these untested theories but also how these theories have remained untested for
such a long period.
To those that admire and view the ICJ as a sacred symbol signaling the global
community’s acceptance of the rule of law notion, the findings reported in this dissertation
may be a bitter truth to swallow. In this dissertation, the findings showing correlations
between the judges’ voting behaviors and extra-legal factors may instinctively lead states
to speculate about the ICJ judges’ impartiality. Consequently, states may be unwilling to
utilize the ICJ for dispute settlement purposes after learning the results of this study.
But as repeatedly stated, it was never the intention of this dissertation to denounce or
discredit ICJ or its reputation. Instead, what I attempted to do and have achieved in this
dissertation is to report the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors and the voting blocs found therein.
From a practical perspective, I hope the findings of this dissertation can help states to have
a better understanding of the ICJ and thus to make rational decisions about whether to
utilize this institution or not. States may also have a more practical expectation of the ICJ’s
performance. By reporting how the ICJ judges’ voting behaviors have been inconsistent
with some of the existing theories, I hope the findings of this dissertation can redirect
scholars to study the ICJ and to strengthen the study of the actual practices of international
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courts. Instead of viewing the findings of this dissertation as a poison that weakens the
legitimacy of the ICJ, I see it as an opportunity for changes to happen.
The ICJ needs changes. Many of the ICJ’s institutional designs and rules set up
seventy years ago are outdated. From issues like the distribution of the seats in the ICJ to
matters like the adoption of the ad hoc judge system and the design of the Court’s
jurisdiction, some of the ICJ’s institutional arrangements and statutory provisions are no
longer popular in the modern world. However, due to the states’ passive attitude over the
ICJ and also the lack of empirical studies showing the problems that the ICJ faces, many
proposals for revising the ICJ become superficial discussions and are discarded as meritless
ideological arguments. There lack junctures to trigger the change.
Although this dissertation cannot comprehensively address every problem and
challenge that the ICJ faces, I nevertheless report some critical observations of the ICJ
judges’ voting behaviors and states can use these findings to evaluate and reconsider the
adequacy of some of the ICJ’s institutional arrangements. Taking the arrangement of the
ad hoc judge system as example, aside from reporting that national judges are keen to vote
for their appointor and home country, I have also shown that the votes of two national
judges are likely to cancel each other out and only possess limited influence over the
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outcome of the case. If states do not benefit from having one of their nationals serving on
the bench, it seems unnecessary for the ICJ to retain such arrangements. The existence of
the ad hoc judge system seems redundant and old style as this arrangement is no longer
adopted by the more recently established international adjudication institutions such as the
WTO DSB. In this way, the findings reached in my dissertation may serve as persuasive
evidence to advise states to revise the ICJ Statute and abolish some unnecessary
arrangements.319
With regard to bloc voting behaviors, although the findings at hand do not allow me
to argue that the existence of voting blocs implies an impartiality problem and it is also too
crude to evaluate the influence of these blocs, the identification of the NATO and
Communist blocs nevertheless signals the possibility that judges’ voting behaviors may
correlate with extra-judicial factors. Geopolitical alliances, ideological matches, and
similarities in the degree of economic development between the countries are also some of
the extra-judicial factors found to correlate with the judges’ clustering behaviors. As the
voting blocs reported in the ICJ share a strong similarity with those identified in the UN
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General Assembly, this information provides an opportunity for regions that are
underrepresented in the ICJ to seek more equitable (if not equal) representation in the Court
and may trigger a change in the ICJ.
In the most recent ICJ judge election held in November 2017, we have witnessed a
groundbreaking change that has altered the traditional practices of the distribution of ICJ
bench seats. As Judge Christopher Greenwood from the United Kingdom was unable to
gain enough support from the General Assembly, he was eventually forced to withdraw his
candidature for reelection. Consequently, the last vacancy of this election was taken by
Judge Bhandari from India. For the first time in ICJ’s 71 years history, the ICJ bench is
composed without a UK judge on board. Although it remains uncertain if this election
result signals the end of the practice of guaranteeing the superpowers a seat in the Court,
as Dr. Salzburg commented: “This may indicate the will of non-Western States to challenge
Western privileges enshrined in customary rules for ICJ elections.”320
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Aside from the states’ change of attitude in the most recent ICJ election, there are
more that can be changed. For instance, if the states distrust the judges serving in the ICJ
and have partiality concerns over their performance, instead of raising accusations against
the judges, a more effective way would be to use their votes to boycott and prevent those
judges from being elected and reelected. If African and Asian states are displeased about
the “equitable geographical distribution” of ICJ seats, instead of complaining about
unfairness, these countries can alter the situation with their superior numbers of votes. As
the ultimate power to reshape and determine the use of this institution is held in the hands
of states, any changes in the Court require the determination and the will of member states.
What studies like this can provide is a report on the performance of the Court, to advise
states how theories have been realized and to provide guidance for future revisions.
3. Final Thoughts
The ICJ needs more attention. Although the ICJ was criticized for not living up to the
expectation of its founders and has not become an effective mechanism in settling interstate
disputes, in the foreseeable future, the ICJ will continue to serve as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. The Court will continue to be one of the most important
international judicial institutions with the power to settle international legal disputes. The
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increasing number of cases submitted to the ICJ in recent decades is a positive sign for the
ICJ’s future. The reviving usage of this institution may also be an opportunity for the ICJ
to redeem its reputation and regain its importance.
Nonetheless, the stereotype that ICJ judges are partial and biased has already been
imprinted in states’ mindsets since the 70s and 80s and will not fade away easily. Although
some states are now more willing to utilize the Court for dispute settlement purposes, they
remain cautious and pay close attention to the Court and its judges’ behaviors. In order to
clarify and provide a more thorough description and report about the decision-making
within the ICJ, research that studies the function and performance of the ICJ needs constant
update, especially those that assess the questions empirically.
In this dissertation, I took the mission to address the questions that ICJ has faced
throughout in its seventy years of history. With the help of empirical analysis methods, I
have reached some preliminary success in demonstrating the clustering behavior between
the ICJ judges and have identified some extra-judicial factors that correlate with the judges’
voting behaviors. However, it was during the research process that I have realize how
limited our knowledge about the ICJ is and how outdated were the empirical studies
assessing the ICJ performance.
207

Aside from hoping that people would be interested in learning new findings about the
ICJ and that those findings contribute to the scholarship, I hope that this study can reattract
the public’s attention to this seventy-year-old judicial institution. By helping states to know
more about the practical function of the ICJ, I hope to assist states to better decide if the
ICJ is the ideal forum to settle disputes and to motivate states to realize the goals of
reforming the ICJ. Moreover, as the area of international law largely remains a virgin land
to empirical study, I hope that this dissertation can stimulate scholars’ interests in assessing
international legal questions with empirical methods and can enrich international legal
scholarship with new forms of study.
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Appendix Results of the Cluster Analyses
Figure A-1: Cluster Analysis of Combined Cases (1946–2015)
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Figure A-2: Cluster Analysis of Combined Cases (1946–1966)
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Figure A-3: Cluster Analysis of Combined Cases (1967–1985)
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Figure A-4: Cluster Analysis of Combined Cases (1985–2015)
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Figure A-5: Cluster Analysis of All Contentious Cases (1946–2015)
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Figure A-6: Cluster Analysis of All Contentious Cases (1946–1966)
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Figure A-7: Cluster Analysis of All Contentious Cases (1967–1984)
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Figure A-8: Cluster Analysis of All Contentious Cases (1985–2015)
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Figure A-9: Cluster Analysis of All Advisory Opinions (1946–2015)
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Figure A-10: Cluster Analysis of All Advisory Opinions (1946–1966)
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Figure A-11: Cluster Analysis of All Advisory Opinions (1967–1984)
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Figure A-12: Cluster Analysis of All Advisory Opinions (1985–2015)
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Figure A-13: Cluster Analysis of Aerial Incidents Case(s) (1946–2015)
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Figure A-14: Cluster Analysis of Aerial Incidents Case(s) (1946–1966)
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Figure A-15: Cluster Analysis of Aerial Incidents Case(s) (1967–1984)
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Figure A-16: Cluster Analysis of Aerial Incidents Case(s) (1985–2015)
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Figure A-17: Cluster Analysis of Diplomatic Relations Case(s) (1946–2015)
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Figure A-18: Cluster Analysis of Diplomatic Relations Case(s) (1946–1966)
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Figure A-19: Cluster Analysis of Diplomatic Relations Case(s) (1967–1984)
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Figure A-20: Cluster Analysis of Diplomatic Relations Case(s) (1985–2015)
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Figure A-21: Cluster Analysis of Property Rights Case(s) (1946–2015)
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Figure A-22: Cluster Analysis of Property Rights Case(s) (1946–1966)

Figure A-23: Cluster Analysis of Property Rights Case(s) (1967–1984)
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Figure A-24: Cluster Analysis of Property Rights Case(s) (1985–2015)
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Figure A-25: Cluster Analysis of Territorial Demarcation Case(s) (1946–2015)

233

Figure A-26: Cluster Analysis of Territorial Demarcation Case(s) (1946–1966)

234

Figure A-27: Cluster Analysis of Territorial Demarcation Case(s) (1967–1984)
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Figure A-28: Cluster Analysis of Territorial Demarcation Case(s) (1985–2015)
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Figure A-29: Cluster Analysis of Trusteeship Case(s) (1946–2015)
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Figure A-30: Cluster Analysis of Trusteeship Case(s) (1946–1966)
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Figure A-31: Cluster Analysis of Trusteeship Case(s) (1967–1984)
N/A
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Figure A-32: Cluster Analysis of Trusteeship Case(s) (1985–2015)
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Figure A-33: Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Case(s) (1946–2015)
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Figure A-34: Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Case(s) (1946–1966)
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Figure A-35: Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Case(s) (1967–1984)
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Figure A-36: Cluster Analysis of Use of Force Case(s) (1985–2015)

244

